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 In the first essay, we study the information content of Form 4 filings under the 
stricter disclosure regulations introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, by 
examining the abnormal returns around the filing date. Our results show that for both the 
purchase and sale samples, the information content of the filings has improved 
significantly between the pre- and post- SOX periods.  We also find that progressive 
regulatory changes and the increased uncertainty in the market in recent years as a result 
of the credit crunch in 2008 have made insider transactions more informative.  Our 
results also show that the rank of the insider (CEO, CFO, etc.) has the most influence in 
explaining the abnormal returns.  Finally, in cross-sectional tests, we find that the 
information content of the filings is stronger for firms with more information asymmetry.  
Overall, we report that the more timely filing requirement introduced by SOX has been 
beneficial for investors, particularly for firms with higher levels of information 
asymmetry. 
 In the second essay, we examine the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 
2002 on the short and long-run performance of corporate acquisitions.  Using a large 
sample of tender offers between 1996 and 2009, we find that the proportion of value 
maximizing acquisitions increased after the passage of SOX. The price run-up and the 
intensity of insider trading prior to the announcement in the target firms have 
substantially decreased after the Act. Using industry and matched firm portfolios, we also 
find that both the operating performance and buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the 
three and five year post-acquisition period improved significantly after SOX. 
 In the final essay, we examine the effects of Ontario Bill-198 (CSOX-2003), the 
strictest corporate law in Canada. Despite some drawbacks, we find the Act has added 
significant value contrary to many practitioners’ beliefs. Using a large sample of 
Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009, we find that both target and acquirer 
shareholders experience higher abnormal returns closer to announcement dates in the post 
CSOX period. Using industry adjusted portfolio, we also find that the long term post-
acquisition operating performances for the acquiring firms have significantly improved in 
the post-Act period. Overall, our results suggest that CSOX has an incremental positive 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
We know the century old saying that “prevention is better than cure”, but unfortunately 
that is not the path that politicians would like to follow in Washington. The collapse of 
Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc. in the early 2000s not only resulted in the loss of 
billions of dollars for investors but also eroded their confidence in the efficacy of existing 
market regulations.  In the immediate aftermath of these major financial disasters, the 
United States Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002.  By any measure, 
SOX has been one of the most comprehensive regulatory changes in the United States 
since the 1930s.  Its many criticisms notwithstanding, SOX has introduced sweeping 
reforms in corporate governance, reporting standards and disclosure requirements. 
 This dissertation is organized in the form of three-essay format. The first essay 
studies how has the information content of insider trading transactions changed under the 
stricter disclosure regulations introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002.  The 
results show that under the new regime, insider trades have become more informative.  
Among the various factors, the rank of the insider appears to be the consistent and single 
most important factor in explaining the market's response to such trades.  This paper also 
finds that SOX was particularly beneficial for firms with higher levels of information 
asymmetry.    
 The second essay builds on the findings in the first paper.  It examines the impact 
of SOX on corporate acquisition activity. In addition to tightening disclosure requirements 
and introducing new standards in corporate governance, SOX substantially increased both 
the civil and criminal penalties for corporate wrongdoings. Using a large sample of tender 
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offers, the study finds that there is a shift in the motive for acquisitions in the post Act 
period and it indicates a move towards proportionately more value maximizing 
acquisitions.  Acquirers in the post Act period display significantly superior post-
acquisition performance compared to the pre Act period and in striking contrast to the 
wide spread post-acquisition underperformance reported in the literature.  These results 
offer a new perspective on the impact of regulatory changes on corporate behavior.   
 The final essay examines the impact of Canadian Bill 198 (Canadian version of 
SOX) on Canadian acquisitions. Unlike the strong results reported for US acquirers, this 
study finds mixed results on the impact of regulations in Canada. 
 The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 introduces the first 
essay entitled, “Regulatory Changes, Market Conditions and the Information Content of 
Insider Trades”; chapter 3 discusses the second essay entitled, “The Effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act on Corporate Acquisition”; chapter 4 describes the final essay entitled, 
“Impact of Canadian SOX from an Acquisition Perspective”; and finally chapter 5 
concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 - Regulatory Changes, Market Conditions and the 
Information Content of Insider Trades 
2.1 Introduction 
 The collapse of Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc. in the early 2000s not only 
resulted in the loss of billions of dollars for investors but also eroded their confidence in 
the efficacy of existing market regulations.  In the immediate aftermath of these major 
financial disasters, the United States Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
1
 (SOX) in 
2002.  By any measure, SOX has been one of the most comprehensive regulatory changes 
in the United States since the 1930s.  Its many criticisms notwithstanding, SOX has 
introduced sweeping reforms in corporate governance, reporting standards and disclosure 
requirements. Among other things, SOX made it mandatory for companies to submit 
insider trade (purchase or sale) information with the Security Exchange Commission 
(SEC) within two business days of the transaction date. This was a substantial 
improvement from the earlier stipulation which required companies to inform the SEC 
within ten days after the close of the calendar month in which the transaction occurred; 
this could potentially result in a delay of up to 40 days.  Clearly, one of the main purposes 
for the more timely disclosure was to improve the information environment for investors.  
This paper studies the information content of Form 4 (the form) filings under the more 
                                               
1 The Act included provisions to promote independent auditing, increase executive responsibility of 
financial reporting, and improved internal control system. SOX addresses the issue of insider trading in 
section 403, which amends section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by requiring insiders to 
report their trades on Form 4 to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within two business days 
after the insider trade takes place. Section 403 of SOX requires insiders’ trades to be filed on a much 
timelier basis (as of August 29, 2002; the Act was passed on July 30, 2002) and mandates electronic filing 
(as of June 30, 2003). 
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timely disclosure regime introduced by Section 403 of SOX and addresses the following 
questions:  Do insider filings after the passage of SOX convey more information to the 
market than before?  If so, is it a function of the rank of the insider?  Are the filings more 
informative for investors in general or is the more timely disclosure particularly 
beneficial for firms with higher levels of information asymmetry to begin with? How has 
the subsequent credit crunch of 2008 affected information in insider trades?   
 Extant research shows that corporate insider trades are associated with subsequent 
stock returns (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Seyhun, 1986), 
suggesting that insiders
2
 act on private information.
3
  As electronic filings became 
mandatory after June 30, 2003, with a stricter reporting deadline of two days, we expect 
the information content of stock prices around the filing date to increase after SOX.  
Stock returns and trading volume have been used in the empirical literature in the past 
(e.g. Brochet, 2010) to measure information content of insider trades. 
 Our paper examines the abnormal stock returns over a two day period beginning 
with the day of the filing.  We compare the pre- and post- SOX data for both purchase 
and sale samples and find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the information content 
of filing has increased after SOX.  Additionally, we also find that the information content 
of insider filings significantly improved between the pre Regulation Fair Disclosure 
                                               
2 In most of the studies, “insiders” are defined as directors, officers, and beneficial owners of more than 
10%, who are subject to the filing requirements with the SEC. 
3 Xu (2008) analyzes Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 which has substantially increased penalties for 
illegal insider trading; the evidence suggests that ITSA effectively reduced informed insider trading.  In 
addition to addressing issues related to corporate governance and timely disclosure, SOX has also imposed 
stricter penalties and given more power to SEC to go after the wrongdoers.   
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(RegFD) and post- SOX period, and between the pre- credit crunch and post- credit 
crunch of 2008.   
 We also examine the impact of firm size, trade size, rank of the executives
4
 and 
delay of filing in cross-sectional regressions to analyze their impact on the information 
content.  We could not find any evidence in the literature linking the impact of an 
insider’s trade with his / her rank in the organization. Existing literature predominantly 
focuses on top executives’ transactions. Seyhun and Bradley (1997) analyzed transactions 
by top executives of the companies that filed for bankruptcies but they do not provide any 
evidence of the rank of the insider and its impact on the stock price. We report 
statistically significant evidence supporting the hypothesis that the higher the rank of the 
insider, the greater the influence he / she exerts on the abnormal return around filing for 
both pre- and post- SOX samples.  
 Reburn (1994), Givoly and Palmon (1985) and Seyhun (1986) have all reported 
an inverse relation between firm size and market reaction to insider transactions.  Chiang 
and Venkatesh (1988) have documented a positive relation between insider holdings and 
information asymmetry.  We find that the smaller the market capitalization, the higher 
(lower) the return around insider purchases (sales), although the results are not 
statistically significant.  
 Since filings have become more frequent in the post- SOX period, a direct 
comparison of the filings between the pre- and post-SOX period could lead to spurious 
                                               
4 Rank1 represents top executives like Chairman, CEO, President, COO, and CFO and the rest are Rank2.  
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conclusions.  Previously, insiders could get away with monthly filings whereas now they 
have to file within two business days. This by itself might create discrepancies in the 
magnitude of the impact. We use the average trade size for the pre-SOX period to 
mitigate this problem. We also analyzed the transactions in the pre-SOX period with only 
a two day filing delay and compared it with those of the post-SOX period and observed 
no significant difference between the two samples.  Thus, trades that were being 
expeditiously filed prior to SOX already were more informative and indicate that quick 
filing has a significant impact on accelerating the information content of the filing.  We 
also replicated the analysis by restricting the post-SOX samples to the companies that 
were in the pre-SOX sample and do not find any significant deviation from our original 
findings.  
 Historically, it has been observed that the SEC has increased its enforcement 
following a market crisis.
5
  For example, the number of litigations filed in the post 1987-
crash period increased significantly. The increased enforcement at that time had a 
positive impact on the confidence of the investors.  The recent 2008 credit crunch offers 
another opportunity to examine how a market crisis affects the information content of 
stock prices.  We compared the transactions before and after the credit crunch
6
 and found 
that the information content has improved further after 2008.  
                                               
5 In fact, SEC was itself created after the market crash in the 1930’s. 
6 In this case pre credit crunch transactions were post SOX and the post credit crunch transaction were also 
post SOX.  We decided to take only post SOX data for the pre-crunch so that we can extract the impact of 
just the credit crunch. 
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 Finally, we divide our sample into firms that have higher and lower levels of 
information asymmetry based on commonly used proxies.  We find that the expeditious 
filing requirement was beneficial for investors in firms with higher information 
asymmetry to begin with.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 provides a survey 
of existing work on the insider trading disclosure regulation and on the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature; section 2.3 describes the data and research 
methodology; section 2.4 discusses the sample and the empirical results; section 2.5 
concludes the study.  
 2.2 Regulations, Insider Trades and Stock Price Effects  
2.2.1 Regulating Insider Trading in the United States 
 The SEC regulates insider trading in the United States.  Directors, officers, and 
principal stockholders (with a stake of 10% or more) have to report most changes in their 
beneficial ownership to the SEC. Until the passage of SOX, reporting requirements were 
defined by section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and consisted of filing 
Form 4 with the SEC within ten days after the close of the calendar month during which 
the transaction had occurred. This could mean a delay of up to 40 days. Section 403 of 
SOX amends this provision as of August 29, 2002 by requiring insiders to file their Form 
4’s with the SEC within two business days of the transaction date.  Moreover, the new 
regulations made electronic filings mandatory starting from June 30, 2003.
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 2.2.2 Impact of Regulations on Insider Trading 
 We expect to observe strong evidence in favor of a comprehensive regulation like 
SOX.  Syed et al. (1989) report that insider trading is associated with abnormal returns.  
Huddart et al. (2001) show that public disclosure of insider trades accelerate price 
discovery compared to the no-disclosure benchmark model of Kyle (1985). Empirically, 
the association between insider trades and future returns documented throughout decades 
of observed corporate insider trading suggests that the average insider trading is a 
potential signal to investors about firm value. As long as the disclosure does not occur 
until after the news that insiders were trading upon, the filing may have information 
content; that is, it may affect a stock’s demand and supply and its equilibrium price.  
 Brochet (2010) analyzes top management insider transactions from 1997 to 2006 
and finds that abnormal returns and trading volumes around insider purchase filings have 
significantly increased in the post SOX period.  He finds evidence that information 
content of insider filings have increased after the passage of SOX.  Fidrmuc et al. (2006) 
find that disclosures of insider trades in the UK elicit average returns that are of greater 
economic significance (mean five-day abnormal returns of 1.65% for purchases and -
0.49% for sales). Information about insider transactions by UK directors and officers is 
required to be publicly available within six business days following the trades. There 
have been counter arguments to the impact of regulations as well.  Rozeff and Zaman 
(1998) conclude that insider trading is not as harmful as it is portrayed. They did not find 
evidence that corporate officers actually earned profits on their private information. 
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 Among all insider transactions in corporate mergers between 1975 and 1995, 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find statistically but not economically significant mean 
market-adjusted returns over a five-day window starting on the filing date, irrespective of 
book-to-market ratio and size (about 0.13% for purchases and -0.23% for sales). Aboody 
and Lev (2000) find more positive (negative) raw returns and higher trading volumes 
following filings of insider purchases (sales) in firms with R&D activity versus other 
firms, but the returns remain low on average.  
 Assuming that insiders trade on their private information to the same extent in the 
UK as in the US, the difference between the result in Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) suggests that disclosure timeliness affects the information content 
of insider-trade filings. As SOX has enhanced the timeliness of insider trade filing, Form 
4 filings after SOX should be more informative than before. 
 Since SOX was enacted to mitigate corporate wrongdoings and insider trading (on 
private information), insiders should be less prone to engage in optimistic trading because 
of increased scrutiny by the investors, media, and regulators. Prior studies show that 
across countries, prosecution of illegal insider trading is associated with a decrease in 
country-level cost of equity (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002), and countries with stricter 
insider-trading regulation exhibit greater diffusion in equity ownership, liquidity, and the 
extent to which stock prices are informative.  Recent research provides evidence 
suggesting that managers’ incentives and opportunities to engage in opportunistic 
behavior have decreased after SOX.  For example, stock return pattern around option 
grants are less favorable to managers after SOX (Heron and Lie, 2007; Narayanan and 
10 
 
Seyhun, 2006a).  Brochet (2010) also finds that the tendency for insiders to trade ahead 
of bad news has significantly declined in the post SOX period.  Based on these evidences, 
while both purchases and sales are expected to be more informative after SOX, we expect 
the information asymmetry linked to insider sales to have decreased more than that of 
insider purchases. 
2.2.3 Factors Affecting the Impact of Insider Transactions 
 It has been well-documented that firm size has an influence on the impact of 
insider transactions. Givoly and Palmon (1985) and Seyhun (1986) report that insiders of 
smaller firms earn larger abnormal returns than insiders of larger firms.  Chiang and 
Venkatesh (1988) have documented a positive relation between insider holdings and 
information asymmetry.
7
  Extant research, therefore, suggests that the timelier filing 
requirement introduced by SOX should affect firms with varying levels of information 
asymmetry differently. 
 Stock returns, trading volume and trade size have been commonly used to study 
the information content of filings (Brochet, 2010).  As demonstrated by Karpoff (1986), 
Kim and Verrechia (1991) and Dontoh and Ronen (1993), information content is 
measured not only in terms of stock returns but also in terms of trading volumes, in 
conjunction with the information environment around the disclosure.  Toutkoushian 
(1996) has examined the determinants of the excess returns that could be earned by 
outsiders from replicating insider transactions. He demonstrates that one of the factors 
                                               
7 Petersen and Rajan (1994) report greater information asymmetry between smaller firms and their 
investors.   
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that influence excess return is the size of insider transaction. While most of the authors 
use absolute trade volume as proxy for trade size, Brochet (2010) uses trade volume 
scaled by total shares outstanding. We use the average transaction amount associated 
with a specific filing date scaled by market capitalization on that date as a proxy for the 
trade size.  In line with the existing literature, we assume that trade size has an impact on 
abnormal returns around filing. Our study shows that the information content of the filing 
contributed by ‘trade size’ increased in the post-SOX period.  We find that the larger the 
trade size, the more positive (negative) is the abnormal return around insider purchase 
(sale) filing. 
 Seyhun and Bradley (1997) analyze insider trading by firms filing for bankruptcy.  
Their sample includes all insiders.  They also analyze the top executives subsample but 
do not examine the relation between insider rank and abnormal return around filing. 
Carpenter and Remmers (2001) examine if insiders use private information to time the 
exercises of their executive stock options. They divide the insider sample into four 
subsamples based on the rank of the executives. However, they only focus on executive 
options and the motivation of the insider in exercising them.  They report statistically 
significant negative post-exercise
8
 stock price performance for the top management 
subsample. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) is one of the few papers that employ 
                                               
8 Before May 1991, insiders had to hold the stock acquired through option exercise for 6 months. Carpenter 
and Remmers (2001) found little evidence of the use of inside information to time exercises since the 
removal of the holding restriction in May 1991. When insiders are free to sell the acquired shares 
immediately, the use of private information should manifest itself as negative abnormal stock price 
performance following option exercise. However, only in the subsample of exercises by top managers at 
small firms, a tiny fraction of the full sample, do they find significantly negative post-exercise stock price 




executive ranking in an extensive manner but their analysis is limited to executive option 
exercises only and not all insider transactions. Yermack (1997) studies option grants and 
concludes that boards of directors, possibly under influence from Chief Executive 
Officers, time grants to top managers so that they precede positive stock price 
performance.  Seyhun (1998) documents positive (negative) abnormal return after 
executive purchase (sell) and also reports the abnormal return to be higher for top 
management. Again, these results (Seyhun, 1998) are based on executive option exercises 
only.  In this study, we extensively analyze the impact of insider ranking on the abnormal 
returns around Form 4 filings.     
2.2.4 SOX and the Information Content of Insider Trades 
 Not all insider trades are equally informative.  One should expect the market 
reaction to insider trade filings to be more informative if the trades are from a higher 
ranking officer.  Lakonishok and Lee (2001) study the impact of insider rankings but 
their sample uses only pre- SOX data.  Yermack (1997) and Carpenter and Remmers 
(2001) examine the affect of insider rankings but in the context of executive stock option 
related transactions.  Brochet (2010) examines both pre- and post- SOX periods but 
focuses only on top executives.  We classify insiders into top management and other 
insiders, where top management (Chief Executive Officer, President, Chairman of the 
Board, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer) are classified as ‘Rank1 Officer’ 
and the rest as ‘Rank2 Officer’.  Our results show that the rank of the insider has a 
significant effect on stock prices around the filing date for both pre- and post- SOX 
periods, with the effect more pronounced in the post- SOX period.  
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 Conceivably, the greatest impact of a comprehensive regulation like SOX should 
be for firms that already have higher levels of information asymmetry, ceteris paribus.  
The stricter and timelier disclosure requirements and the substantial governance 
compliance requirements introduced by SOX should help alleviate the information 
disadvantage to investors in such firms in particular.  In this paper, we systematically 
analyze the information content of insider trades for firms with varying levels of 
information asymmetry.  A number of information asymmetry measures have been used 
in the literature such as Book-to-Market (B/M) and Firm Size (Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001), spending on R&D (Aboody and Lev, 2000) and return volatility, R&D 
expenditure, and accounting quality (Bae et al., 2011).  In addition, a higher proportion of 
intangible assets have also been found to be associated with more information 
asymmetry.  In general, it is well documented that smaller high growth firms have more 
information asymmetry compared to larger mature firms. We use B/M, spending on R&D 
and the proportion of intangible assets as proxies for information asymmetry to 
investigate if the announcement period returns around insider transaction announcements 
in the pre- and post- SOX periods systematically vary.  We find evidence consistent with 
the hypothesis that insider transactions have become more informative in the post- SOX 
period for high information asymmetry firms. 
 We also examine how the changes in the risk of the financial markets in the post- 
SOX period affected the information content of Form 4 filings.  The credit crunch 
following the large scale failures of major financial institutions in recent years further 
increased the uncertainty and risk for investors.  Our study finds that the increased 
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uncertainty in the post credit crunch period have made insider filings more informative 
compared to the pre credit crunch but post- SOX period.  
 2.3. Data and Methodology 
2.3.1 Data Selection and Sample Description 
 The sample for this study was obtained from EDGAR Online. The pre-SOX 
sample covers all insider transactions from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002 while the 
post-SOX period is from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We exclude firms with 
insufficient or no data on stock returns on CRSP. Our final sample consists of 41,603 
unique transactions for the post-SOX period and 2,182 for the pre-SOX period.  No 
other restrictions are enforced other than the one regarding CRSP missing data issue. 
The lower number for pre-SOX transactions is reasonable as companies typically filed 
once a month only, whereas SOX now requires them to file within two business days. 
 We also test for Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) which was passed on 
October 2000. Since this regulation brought an added layer of fairness to the market, it 
boosted investor confidence and is expected to have enhanced the information content of 
insider filings. Sundar (2002) reports that Regulation FD has a greater impact for firms 
with high information asymmetry characteristics.  In addition, investor confidence is 
significantly affected by market conditions.  The severe credit crunch following the large 
scale failures of financial institutions after the recent recession has increased the 
uncertainty for the investors.  We also examine if the information content of insider 
trades increased after the credit crunch.   
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[Table 2-1 here] 
 Table 2-1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample.  Both the means and 
medians display significant differences between the pre and post SOX periods for all 
variables for both the purchase and the sales samples.  The mean and median market 
capitalization in the post SOX period is significantly larger than the pre-SOX period.  
Likewise, the mean and median trade size is significantly different between the two 
periods.  For both the purchase and sales samples, we find that in the pre- SOX period 
the average delay between the trade date and the filing date is a whole calendar month.  
This time lag could potentially be substantially disadvantageous to investors, particularly 
for firms with larger levels of information asymmetry.  The expeditious filing 
requirement introduced by SOX has reduced both the incentive for insiders to trade on 
private information as well as minimized the information disadvantage for investor.     
2.3.2 Variable Definitions 
 The sample includes both transaction and filing dates. In line with the existing 
literature (e.g. Cheng et al, 2007; Cohen, 2005 etc.) this study uses the filing date to be 
the date of interest. As insider transactions become public on filing date, any information 
content of the filing should be captured by the stock market reaction around this date.  
  We include a rank variable to denote the rank of the executive involved in the 
insider transaction. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) and Yermack (1997) have both used 
executive ranking to some extent but these studies restrict their analysis to executive 
stock options.  We classify the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), President, Chairman of 
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the Board, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and Chief Operating Officer (COO) as Rank1 
officer and all other executives as Rank2 officer. A dummy variable labeled Insider 
Rank, whose value equals to one if the transaction is executed by a ‘Rank 1’ officer and 
zero otherwise, is employed in the cross sectional regression analysis.                                           
 The size of the insider trade can have an important bearing on the stock price 
response on the filing date. Karpoff (1986), Dontoh and Ronen (1993) and Brochet 
(2010) have all used some variation of trading volume as an identifying factor of 
information content.  We use the average trade size (TradeSize) for both pre and post 
periods in our analyses.
 
 
 Transaction size has also been found to be related to firm size.   Seyhun (1986) 
divides his sample into five subsamples based on market capitalization (less than $25 
million; between $25 million and $50 million; between $50 million and $250 million; 
between $250 million and $1 billion; more than $1 billion etc.).  Similarly, Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) divide their sample into three subsamples, namely, small, medium, and 
large cap firms.  They further divide their data into deciles and then make a 3-4-3 split 
for small, medium, and large cap samples respectively. We split the sample along the 
median when we run a comparison between small and large cap firms. We use market 
capitalization, MktCap, as an independent variable in the cross sectional regression 
analysis. 
 The time lag between the transaction date and the filing date, Delay, can also 
affect the market's response to the filing.  On the one hand, longer gaps between the two 
dates can result in stock prices deviating significantly from their equilibrium prices as 
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the information related to trade itself would not be incorporated in the price.  Thus, the 
filing event should be more informative.  On the other hand, a longer gap can also result 
in smaller price reaction on the filing date if the information related to the trade leaks 
prior to the filing.  We hypothesize a negative relation between Delay and the stock 
price response around the filing. 
 Based on previous literature, we use Market-to-Book ratio, Intangible Asset, and 
R&D expenditure as proxies for information asymmetry. Market-to-Book is measured as 
total market capitalization to book value of equity, R&D expenditure is scaled by total 
sales and Intangible Asset is scaled to total assets. As independent variables for the 
information asymmetry tests, we use Market-to-Book, MktCap, ‘InsiderRank’ dummy, 
and Dividend Yield.  
2.3.3 Cross-Sectional Analyses 
 The following cross-sectional regression is used to test the relation between the 
abnormal returns around filing dates and determinants of the Form 4 filings: 
CAR0, 1 = 0 + 1*InsiderRank 2*TradeSize + 3*Delay + 4*MktCap + 5*R&D + 
6*(TradeSize*InsiderRank) + 7*(MktCap*InsiderRank)    [2.1] 
  
 The dependent variable, CAR0,1, is the two day market adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return around the filing date, which is classified as day 0. Independent variables 
are as defined in section 2.3.2.   
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 To examine how the level of information asymmetry affects the abnormal returns 
around the filing announcement date, we follow the methodology described in the Bae et 
al. (2011).  In all regressions, we partition the sample into subsamples based on three 
information asymmetry measures: Market-to-Book, Intangible Assets, and R&D.  High 
information asymmetry firms are ones with the Market-to-Book ratio, intangible assets, 
and R&D expenditures above the median value.  The basic regression model is as 
follows: 
CAR0, 1 = 0 + 1*Market-to-Book + 2*MktCap + 3*InsiderRank + 4*Dividend Yield   
[2.2] 
 We use Dividend Yield as an additional control variable for information 
asymmetry.  Extant literature (Khang and King
9
, 2006; Li and Zhao
10
, 2008 etc.) shows 
that high dividend yield firms typically have lower levels of information asymmetry, all 
else being equal.  
                                               
9 They find that firms with higher dividend yield not only have lower information asymmetry but also the 
insiders earn lower returns from their trades. 




2.4. Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Abnormal Returns around the Filing Date   
 We begin first by analyzing the market model abnormal returns around the filing 
date that are computed using the event study methodology as described in Patell (1976).  
The CRSP value-weighted index is used as the market portfolio in the market model 
where the model parameters are computed using an estimation period from t = -380 to    
t= -127 where t=0 is the filing date.  
[Table 2-2 here] 
 The event study results for insider purchases and sales from both the pre and post 
SOX periods are reported in Table 2-2.  The mean two day CAR for the pre- SOX period 
is 0.32% and significant at the 10% level and 1.13% for post- SOX and significant at the 
5%; the difference between pre- and post- SOX is significant at the 10% level.  This 
suggests that the filings have become more informative in the post- SOX period, 
consistent with the findings in Brochet (2010).  Fidrmuc et al. (2006) also find evidence 
that swifter disclosure law in the United Kingdom improved the information content of 
the filings.  The prompt filing required by SOX has had a similar effect. 
 We also report abnormal returns for different windows around the filing date.  A 
positive abnormal return pattern emerges a week before the actual filing in the pre- SOX 
period and these returns are more prominent than the post- SOX abnormal returns for the 
same period. For example, we find that the returns for the window (-10, -2) are much 
higher in the pre period, possibly driven by information leakage due to the longer delay 
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between transactions and filings. No evidence of information leakage is found for the 
post SOX period. 
 Panel B reports the results for insider sales transactions.  Overall the results are 
less significant compared to the purchase sample. The abnormal returns (CAR0,1) around 
the filing dates are slightly more negative for the post- SOX than pre- SOX period, but 
the difference between the two periods is not statistically significant. The pre SOX 
cumulative abnormal return is -0.19%, significant at 10% level, while the post SOX 
return is -0.54% and significant at 5% level, with the difference not statistically 
significant.  Similar results are found for the other windows around the filing date.  
Overall, the results in Table 2-2 show that insider transactions have become more 
informative in the post- SOX period.  
[Table 2-3 here] 
 We further investigate how the delay in the filing in the pre- SOX period affected 
the abnormal returns since insiders had as much as forty calendar days before the 
transactions had to be reported.  Table 2-3 reports the results around filing for different 
delay lengths for the pre- SOX period for both the purchase and sale samples in Panels A 
and B, respectively.  For both samples we observe that the number of filings increased 
with the delay whereas the magnitude of the abnormal return was lower with longer 
delays.  
 In Panel A, for the purchase sample, more than 85 percent of the filings had a 
delay of 10 days or more and nearly 52 percent of the filings had a delay of 20 days or 
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more.  For the two days (-1,0), the CARs are 0.11% for filings of delays of at least 20 
days and these are significant at the 5% level.  As the delay shortens, the magnitude of 
the CARs increases.  However, the statistical significance disappears.  Similar results are 
observed for the event windows (0,+1) and (-1,+1).  In Panel B, for the sales sample, the 
results follow a similar pattern.  Ninety percent of the filings have a delay of 10 days or 
more and nearly 58 percent of the filings are delayed by 20 days or more.  Once again the 
abnormal returns are smaller in magnitude and statistically significant for delays of 10 
days or more and the magnitude increases but the significance disappears as the delay 
shortens. 
 Longer delays in reporting the transaction increase the likelihood that information 
about the trade may be known prior to the actual filing.  If this is true, it can explain the 
smaller magnitudes of the abnormal returns for longer delays for both the purchase and 
sales samples.  However, the insignificant but larger abnormal returns for shorter delays 
still pose a puzzle.  It is quite possible that lack of significance is because of the reduced 
sample size. It is also, however, possible that firms with shorter delays have less 
information asymmetry and insider trades are less informative compared to firms with 
longer delays.  We investigated this conjecture further by examining the proxies of 
information asymmetry for firms with longer and shorter delays.  In unreported results, 
we find that firms with delays less than 10 days have significantly less R&D 
expenditures, proportionately less intangible assets and lower market-to-book ratios of 
equity compared to firms with delays of 20 days or more.  Our evidence suggests that 
firms with larger levels of information asymmetry were more likely to delay reporting 
insider trades and investors in these firms are the ones who would benefit the most from 
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the expeditious reporting requirement introduced by SOX.  We investigate this further in 
our cross-sectional analysis.  
2.4.2 Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) 
 Regulation Fair Disclosure [Reg FD] was passed in October 2000. This regulation 
was intended to reduce the information asymmetry between small and institutional 
investors.  It was credited to have fundamentally changed the way corporations 
communicate with investors.  Even though it was not as extensive as SOX, one would 
still expect Reg FD to have an impact on the information content of insider filings.  
Regulation FD aided the dissemination of information in a fair manner and helped reduce 
the information asymmetry.  
[Table 2-4 here] 
 We divide our pre SOX sample into two subsamples; pre Reg FD and post Reg 
FD.  Pre Reg FD covers all transactions from January 1, 1996 to September 30, 2000, 
while post Reg FD subsample covers transactions from October 1, 2000 to August 29, 
2002.  The results are reported in Table 2-4. 
 Panel A reports the results pertinent to the insider purchase filings. For the (0,+1) 
window, the pre Reg FD cumulative abnormal return is 0.26% (significant at 10% level) 
while the post Reg FD CAR is 0.52% (significant at 10% level).  Similar results are 
obtained for the other two windows. Reg FD thus had a positive impact on the 
information content of insider filings.  Xu (2008) finds similar results for ITSA.   
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 To isolate the impact of Reg FD, we compare the pre Reg FD and post SOX 
subsamples. The pre Reg FD CAR of 0.26% and the post-SOX CAR of 1.13% for the (0, 
+1) window are statistically significantly different at the 1% level.   The differences for 
the (-1,0) and (-1,+1) windows are also statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.   
 Results for the sales sample are presented in Panel B. There is no significant 
difference between the pre Reg FD and post Reg FD periods, although the magnitude in 
the post Reg FD period is larger.  Once again, however, after isolating the impact of Reg 
FD, we find the abnormal return of -0.12% for the pre Reg FD period and -0.54% for the 
post-SOX period are statistically significantly different at the 10% level. Similar results 
are obtained for the (-1,+1) window. It appears that progressive layers of regulations 
starting in 2000 have had a positive impact in reducing information asymmetry for 
investors as reflected in the stronger market response to insider trading transactions. 
2.4.3 Impact of the Credit Crunch of 2008 
 The economy in the United States started to slow down in 2007.  By 2008, the 
economy was officially in a recession with increased market volatility and uncertainty for 
investors.  Bear markets present an added challenge for investors.  For e.g., the post 1987 
market crash saw an increase in the number of SEC initiated litigations. The credit crunch 
of 2008 was more severe and far more widespread than the market crash of 1987, with 
many commentators, market participants and academics comparing it to the great 
depression of the 1930s.  Given the increased uncertainty and volatility in the market, we 
expect Form 4 filings to be more informative in the post-credit crunch period.  
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 We divide our post- SOX sample into two subsamples; pre-credit crunch period 
from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2007 and post-credit crunch period from January 
1, 2008 to December 31, 2009.  Results are reported in Panels A and B of Table 2-4 for 
the purchase and sales samples, respectively. 
 For the purchases sample in Panel A, we find that the two day cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR0,1) before the credit crunch is 0.82% while it is 1.74% after the 
credit crunch.  The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.  Similar results 
are reported for the other two windows.  Likewise, for the sales sample in Panel B, the 
return is more negative for the post credit crunch period (-0.97%) compared to the pre-
credit crunch period (-0.46%) for days (0,+1) and the difference is significant at the 5% 
level.  Results for both the purchases and sales samples show that insider trades are 
strongly affected by the prevailing uncertainty in the economic environment.   
 Taken together, the empirical results reported in Tables 2-3 and 2-4 show a strong 
positive association between information asymmetry and the information conveyed by 
insider trading transactions. Progressive regulatory changes have improved the disclosure 
requirements for transactions by insiders. These changes have been more beneficial for 
investors in an environment of greater uncertainty and firms with larger information 
asymmetry problems. We next investigate the impact of information asymmetry further 
using cross-sectional analysis. 
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2.4.4 Cross Sectional Tests  
 We next examine the factors that affect the announcement period returns around 
insider filing.  The dependent variable in the regressions is the two-day abnormal return 
(CAR0,1) around the announcement date.  The results are reported in Table 2-5.  
[Table 2-5 here] 
 Panel A reports the regression results for both pre and post SOX purchase 
transactions.   We divide the pre- SOX sample into the pre Reg FD and post Reg FD 
periods and the post- SOX sample onto the pre-credit crunch and post-credit crunch 
periods.  The executive ranking dummy InsiderRank is statistically significant for both 
the pre- and post-SOX samples at the 5% level consistently, except for the pre Reg FD 
period where it is significant at the 10% level.  As one would expect, the rank of the 
insider has a significant impact on the information conveyed to the market at the time of 
filing.  The finding is consistent with Carpenter et al. (2001) and Yermack (1997), who 
have used executive ranking in the context of executive stock options only, and Brochet 
(2010), who analyzes information content of insider filings but mainly focuses on top 
executives’ transactions.  For the pre- SOX period, Delay is negative and significant 
consistently, with the result more pronounced for the pre Reg FD period, while R&D is 
positive and significant for the post Reg FD period. The negative relation with Delay is 
consistent with Fidrmuc et al. (2006) who note that shorter filing delays increase 
abnormal return around filing. Bae et al. (2011) report that firms with higher R&D 
expenditure have higher information asymmetry. The significant positive coefficient for 
the R&D variable implies that higher R&D firms have higher impact on the two day 
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abnormal return around filing, suggesting insider trades are more informative for firms 
with higher information asymmetry. TradeSize is not significant in any of the regressions 
for the pre- SOX sample.  However, we do find that larger trades by higher ranked 
insiders have a negative relation with the abnormal returns around the filing.  For the 
post- SOX period, we find that for both the pre and post credit crunch periods, 
InsiderRank, TradeSize and R&D are positive and significant, and larger trades by higher 
ranked insiders result in larger abnormal returns around the announcement of the filing.  
Overall, the pre- SOX sample provides significant coefficients for InsiderRank, Delay 
and R&D while for the post SOX sample coefficients are significant for InsiderRank, 
TradeSize and R&D. Evidence in Panel A consistently shows that ranking of the 
corporate officer is an important determinant of the information content of the 
transaction.  For the post-SOX period, we also find that larger trades by senior officers 
are more informative.  However, for the pre-SOX period, the delay in filing has a 
moderating effect on the information content of trades by senior officers.   The regression 
results for the purchase sample consistently display a positive relation between 
information asymmetry and the information content of the filing.
11
  
 Panel B reports the regression results for insider sales. Overall, the results for 
InsiderRank and R&D are consistent with those reported for the purchase sample. For the 
pre Reg FD period, Delay is positive and significant while TradeSize is negative and 
marginally significant as well. Sales transactions by senior officers and those in firms 
                                               
11 We also estimated other models separately with only InsiderRank, with InsiderRank, TradeSize and 
Delay, and with InsiderRank, R&D and MktCap.  The results from these models are consistent with the full 
model results reported in Table 5.  These results are not reported for brevity but are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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with larger information asymmetry convey more negative news to the market around the 
filing date.     For the pre- SOX period, the results are stronger for the pre Reg FD period 
while for the post- SOX sample; they are stronger for the post credit crunch period.  The 
evidence reported in Panel B once again suggests that the degree of information 
asymmetry remains an important factor in explaining the stock price response around the 
filing date.   
[Table 2-6 here] 
 We next partition our pre- and post- SOX sample into firms with high and low 
levels of information asymmetry. Three different proxies are used to measure information 
asymmetry: market-to-book value of equity, proportion of intangible assets and spending 
on R&D.  The evidence so far strongly shows a positive relation between the level of 
information asymmetry and the information content of filings.  Partitioning the sample in 
this fashion will allow us to determine if SOX was incrementally more beneficial for 
firms with larger information asymmetry to begin with. Our approach is similar to that of 
Bae et al. (2011) who examine the forecasting power of hedge funds for stocks with high 
and low information asymmetry.  The dependent variable is again the two-day abnormal 
return around the filing date (CAR0,1). In addition to the variables used earlier, we include 
Dividend Yield as an additional control variable for information asymmetry.  The results 
are reported in Table 2-6. 
 Panel A shows the results for the purchase sample.  Focusing first on firms with 
low information asymmetry in the pre-SOX period, we find that none of the variables are 
significant in most of the regressions, including the rank of the insider. The only 
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exception is MktCap in one regression that is marginally significant.  For firms with high 
information asymmetry in the pre-SOX period, the coefficient on InsiderRank is 
consistently positive and significant.  In addition, there is some evidence that dividend 
yield and firm size are negatively related and Market-to-Book is positively related to the 
announcement period returns. Thus, even before SOX was enacted, trades were 
considered valuable news events only for firms with higher levels of information 
problems.   Turning now to the post-SOX sample, we once again find that none of the 
variables are significant for low information asymmetry firms. The only exception is 
insider rank that is positive and marginally significant in one regression.  For firms with 
high information asymmetry on the other hand, InsiderRank is consistently positively 
significant at the 1% level, MktCap is negative and significant at the 5% level, market-to-
book ratio is positive and significant at the 5% level and dividend yield is negative and 
marginally significant.  The results for the post-SOX period for the high information 
asymmetry firms are stronger compared to similar firms from the pre-SOX period.  The 
evidence in Panel A shows that the prompt filing requirements mandated by SOX 
improved the information environment for investors in firms with greater uncertainty.   
These results are consistent with Sundar (2002) who analyzes another pro-investor 
regulation (Regulation Fair Disclosure) and finds that it has a greater impact on the firms 
with higher information asymmetry.  
 Panel B reports the results for the sales sample.  Once again for both the pre- and 
post-SOX periods, we do not find significant results for firms with low information 
asymmetry, except the rank of the insider, which is negative and marginally significant in 
three out of the six regressions.  For firms with high information asymmetry, on the other 
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hand, InsiderRank is consistently negative and significant at least at the 5% level. In 
addition, the coefficient on market-to-book is consistently negative and significant with 
the significance level stronger for the post-period compared to the pre period.  The 
evidence again shows that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry and trades 
by senior officers experience larger declines in stock returns around the filing date.   
 The evidence in Table 2-6 suggests that the expeditious filing requirement of 
insider trades introduced by SOX had a differing impact on firms.  In general, trades by 
senior officers are more informative now than they were previously and the information 
content of timelier filing is more relevant for firms with higher levels of information 
asymmetry. 
2.4.5 Robustness Tests 
 We conducted several robustness checks to ensure that our results were not 
sample specific.  These results are not reported here for brevity but are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 We compared the post SOX transactions with pre SOX transactions that were 
filed within two business days and found no significant difference between the abnormal 
returns of the two samples. It appears, therefore, the delay in the filing before the Act had 
a significant impact on the information content and the expedited filing required by the 
SOX had a major impact to improve the information content.  
 We replicated all of our analysis by restricting the post-SOX sample to the 
companies that are in the pre-SOX sample, and do not find any significant deviation from 
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our original findings. We also replicated the entire analysis by including S&P 500 firms 
only, and our results remained qualitatively unchanged. 
 We also used some alternate definitions of some of the variables. For e.g., we 
computed TradeSize using three different measures: average shares traded to common 
shares outstanding, average shares traded to annual common shares traded, and average 
transaction amount to total assets.  For the information asymmetry tests, we also used P/E 
in place of market-to-book ratio.  The results remained qualitative similar with these 
alternate measures. 
 Finally, for the event study comparisons between the pre- and post SOX samples, 
we analyzed subsamples of transactions only by rank1 officers, only by rank2 officers, 
only by small cap firms, only by large cap firms, only small trade size, only large trade 
size, only value firms, and only growth firms.  Our results qualitatively did not change.  
2.5. Conclusions 
 This paper analyzes the information content of insider filings for the 1996 to 2009 
period. Under the SOX provisions introduced in 2002, corporations have to file insider 
transactions with the SEC within two business days of the trade whereas previously they 
could wait up to 40 days. This is a significant regulatory improvement aimed at 
enhancing transparency and reducing information asymmetry between firm insiders and 
investors. 
 We find that the timely filing requirement has improved the information content 
of the filings. We report significantly larger abnormal returns around the filing date in the 
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post- SOX period compared to the pre- SOX period. Our results also show that 
progressive regulatory changes have had a positive impact on the information content of 
the filings.  For example, the abnormal returns are consistently larger in magnitude for 
both the purchase and sales samples from the pre Regulation FD period to the post- SOX 
period.  In addition, we also find that the increased uncertainty in the market after the 
credit crunch of 2008 have made filings of insider transactions even more informative. 
 In cross-sectional tests, we find that the rank of the insider is an important 
determinant in the information conveyed by the filing.  For both the purchase and sales 
samples, we report that trades by higher ranked insiders are accompanied by larger 
abnormal returns.   In addition, firms with more information asymmetry and larger trades 
convey more information in general.  Finally, our results show that while the information 
environment has improved for investors in the post- SOX period overall, insider filings 
are particularly important for firms with larger levels of information asymmetry to begin 
with. 
 The many criticisms of SOX notwithstanding, our paper shows that the timely 
filing requirement of insider trades have been beneficial for investors.   
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Chapter 3 - The Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Corporate Acquisition 
3.1 Introduction 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
12
 of 2002 is by far the most comprehensive 
regulation enacted in the United States in the post-war period.  From better governance to 
more transparency in corporate disclosure to timelier reporting of trading activity, SOX 
addresses a wide range of issues.  For e.g., insider transactions are now required to be 
reported within two trading days compared to as many as forty calendar days prior to the 
Act.  Better and timelier disclosure has no doubt improved the information environment 
and improved transparency for investors. 
 In this paper we examine what impact the Act has had on corporate acquisition.  
Specifically, we address the following issues: 1) the stricter disclosure requirements for 
security transactions introduced by SOX is expected to reduce the incentive for insiders 
to trade on private information. Consequently, we expect the announcement effects for 
acquisitions to be stronger in the post Act period together with less price run up for 
targets prior to the announcement. We investigate if acquisition announcements have 
become more informative in the post SOX period. 2) A reduced incentive to transact on 
private information is also likely to affect the motives for acquisitions. Shareholder 
wealth maximization rather than agency may drive acquisition decisions since the 
                                               
12 The Act included provisions to promote independent auditing, increase executive responsibility of 
financial reporting, and improved internal control system. SOX addresses the issue of insider trading in 
section 403, which amends section 16(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 by requiring insiders to report their 
trades on Form 4 to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within two business days after the 
insider trade takes place. Section 403 of SOX requires insiders’ trades to be filed on a much timelier basis 




opportunities to benefit from private information have diminished for insiders in the post 
Act period.  We, therefore, expect to see an increase in the proportion of synergy driven 
acquisitions in the post SOX period.  If this is indeed true, in turn it should on average 
lead to better post-acquisition performance, or at least less underperformance, for 
acquiring firms.  
 Empirical evidence abounds with respect to insider trading around major 
corporate announcements (Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Damodaran and Liu, 1993; and 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1981).  As long as the benefits of insider trading outweigh the 
costs of getting litigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it is 
conceivable that insiders would have the incentive to engage in transactions based on 
private information
13
.SOX was enacted in the United States in the aftermath of large 
scale corporate scandals in the early 2000s. Some of the principal goals of the statute 
were to reduce the information asymmetry between investors and firm insiders, improve 
corporate governance and oversight, and bring investor confidence back.  To achieve 
these goals, SOX incorporated stricter civil and criminal penalties. These penalties, along 
with an increased rate of litigation by SEC since the passage of the Act, have markedly 
reduced the incentives for corporate insiders from informed insider trading. 
 There is considerable empirical evidence on pre-bid price run up in target firms' 
stock.  Keown and Pinkerton (1981) propose that price run-ups are driven by insider 
trading and insiders profit from the time of their transactions until the information 
                                               
13 Xu (2008) shows that stricter regulations deter insiders from trading on private information by analyzing 
the effects of Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), the first federal level trading statute since 
1934 with added penalties for illegal insider trading.  Her results show that pre-announcement insider 
trading frequency as well as abnormal return decreased significantly after the passage of ITSA. 
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becomes publicly available.   Prior to SOX, the reporting requirements for insider trades 
could result in a delay of as many as forty calendar days before the data on insider 
transactions were publicly available.  SOX reduced this delay to two business days
14
. 
This expedited filing requirement is likely to reduce pre-announcement insider net 
purchases of target shares as well as price run ups
15
 in the post SOX period. This in turn 
should make the announcement itself more informative as well. 
 Also, the vast body of empirical research on corporate acquisitions has examined 
synergy, agency, and hubris as possible motives for acquisitions.  Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) report that value maximizing (synergy) takeovers occur because of 
economic gains that result by merging the resources of the two firms, and agency driven 
takeovers occur because they enhance the acquirer managements' welfare at the expense 
of their shareholders.  With less incentive to act on private information, the more 
transparent environment in the post-SOX period is likely to see more value maximizing 
or synergy driven acquisitions.   
 Another well-documented phenomenon in the literature is the post-acquisition 
underperformance of acquiring firms.  It is largely believed to be due to managerial over-
optimism, agency or managerial hubris (Agrawal et al., 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 
                                               
14 The early filing requirement has not only improved the information content of the filings (Brochet, 2010) 
but also reduced information asymmetry in general (Bhabra and Hossain, 2012). 
15 Xu (2008) reports that price-run-up for target firms has decreased after the passage of ITSA.  Since SOX 
imposes even more severe penalties and has stricter reporting requirements compared to ITSA, we expect 





. If indeed it is true that synergy driven acquisitions proportionately increased in 
the post Act period, we expect the long-run underperformance following acquisitions to 
decrease, regardless of whether it is a diversified or same industry transaction.  
 In this paper, we examine the impact of SOX on several aspects of an acquisition 
—pre-bid price run-up, announcement period wealth affects, takeover motive, and post 
acquisition long term performance. Using a large sample of completed tender offers 
between 1996 and 2009, we find that proportionately there were more synergy-driven 
acquisitions in the post-SOX period, smaller price run ups prior to the announcement as 
well as significantly larger positive abnormal returns to target firm shareholders around 
the announcement date. Our results also show that acquiring firm shareholders earn 
significant positive abnormal returns around the announcement in the post-SOX period 
compared to the negative returns observed in the pre-SOX period.  In the long-term, we 
find that both the operating performance and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the 
three and five years after the acquisition, adjusted for industry and matched firm 
portfolios, are significantly better in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX 
period.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 provides a survey 
of existing work on the insider trading disclosure regulation related to information theory 
and mergers and acquisitions, and the existing theoretical and empirical literature; section 
3.3 describes the data and research methodology; section 3.4 discusses the sample and the 
                                               
16 Laeven and Levine (2007) reports that there is a diversification discount for financial conglomerates. 




empirical results; section 3.5 describes the robustness tests; and section 3.6 concludes the 
study.   
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Regulations, insider trading and acquisitions 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the principal authority on 
insider trading related issues in the United States. Insiders are defined as corporate 
executives, board of directors, and the block holders (with ownership of 10% or more) by 
the SEC. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is undoubtedly the most comprehensive 
regulation passed by the US Congress in the post war era. One of the main attributes of 
the Act is that it mandates insiders to report their transactions with the company within 
two business days whereas previously they could wait as long as forty calendar days. The 
Act also made electronic filings mandatory starting from June 30, 2003. It also increased 
the penalties for insider trading. Under ‘Title IX’ of the law17, the maximum penalty 
increased from a five-year prison term to twenty years while the monetary penalties 
increased ten folds in some instances.  




, and Jorion et al (2005)
20
 find evidence 
in favor of the positive impacts of the short-swing rule (section 16b of the Securities 
                                               
17 TITLE IX—WHITE-COLLAR CRIME PENALTY ENHANCEMENTS 
18 They examine the premerger trading by top management of target firms from 1941 to 1961 and find that 
managers’ purchases drop significantly before the announcement due to the short-swing rule [section 16b 
of the Securities Exchange Act, 1934]. 
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Exchange Act, 1934), the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, and Regulation Fair 
Disclosure of 2000, respectively. A comprehensive law like SOX is likely to further deter 
insider trading based on private information. The information advantage of insider 
trading have no doubt diminished due to the expedited filing requirements of SOX, thus 
increasing the information content of the filing itself (Brochet, 2010)
21
. More timely 
disclosure and reduced information asymmetry make corporate announcements more 
informative. In our context, acquisition announcements are, thus expected to be more 
informative and less preceded by price run ups in the post-SOX period. 
3.2.2 Information leakage and market anticipation hypotheses 
 Insider trading
22
 around merger activities
23
 in the respective firms has long been 
of interest to financial economists. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) find that information 
                                                                                                                                            
19She analyzes the effects of Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), the first federal level trading 
statute since 1934 with added penalties for illegal insider trading, and reports that insider trading frequency 
decreased significantly upon the passage of the Act.  She examines pre-merger-announcement insider 
trading behavior of target firms between 1979 and 1989 and finds a significant decline in net purchases. 
She also observes that price run up before merger announcement declined after the passage of ITSA and 
concludes that ITSA effectively reduced informed insider trading. 
20 They analyze the impact of Regulation FD (2000) on credit ratings. They analyze the impact of credit 
rating changes on stock price for t=-26 months to t=26 months where t=0 is when the regulation was 
enacted. They find the information effect is higher in the post Regulation FD period. 
21 Bhabra and Hossain (2012) analyze insider trades by all the officers between 1996 and 2009 and find 
ranking of the officers and timeliness of filings to be the two most dominant factors contributing to the 
enhancement of the informativeness of the filings. 
22Huddart et al (2001) show that public disclosure of insider trades accelerate price discovery compared to 
the no-disclosure benchmark model of Kyle (1985). Rozeff and Zaman (1998) report that insider trading is 
not as harmful as it is portrayed.  
23Among all insider transactions in corporate mergers in 1975-1995, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find 
statistically but not economically significant mean market-adjusted returns over a five-day window starting 





leakage takes place before the merger announcement and so does insider trading as well.  
But they also show that semi-strong form of market efficiency still holds as the market 
reaction to new public information is complete by the day after the announcement. 
Meulbroek (1992) reports that about half of the pre-bid price run-up observed before 
acquisitions occurs on insider trading days. Schwert (1996) states that run-up is an added 
cost to the bidder which means that the longer persistent run up will decrease the net 
present value of the transaction to the acquiring shareholders.  
 The market anticipation hypothesis contends that investors use a number of 
publicly available information sources to decipher important events prior to public 
announcement, with share prices impacted to reflect updated beliefs (e.g., Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983). The establishment of a large share position in a firm or the publication of 
takeover rumors (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989) can also signal impending takeovers. Jabbour 
et al. (2000) find that abnormal stock price performance at the early stage prior to the 
acquisition announcement is due to actual trading by corporate insiders; however, the 
run-up immediately preceding the takeover announcement appears to be due to market 
anticipation about an impending bid for the target. 
 The expedited filing requirements in the post SOX period have diminished the 
motivation to trade around the announcement date.  In addition, the stricter penalties 
(Title IX of SOX) provide further deterrence for insiders to act on private information.  
Both factors are expected to contribute to a reduced pre bid price run up as well as a 
stronger stock price response around the announcement date.  
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3.2.3 Motives for acquisitions 
 Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) examine three different motives for takeovers: 
synergy or value maximizing takeovers, agency driven takeovers, and hubris driven 
takeovers. They use a sample of 330 tender offers between 1963 and 1988. The synergy 
or value maximizing takeovers are described as ones where management works in the 
best interest of the shareholders i.e. they merge with another firm in a positive NPV 
transaction. They report that in these types of transactions, the gains to the target, the 
acquirer, and total gain are all positive and are positively correlated with each other.  On 
the other hand, an agency driven
24
 merger is one where the acquirer’s management 
executes the transaction in their own best interest at the expense of the stockholders of 
their firm. These transactions are characterized as ones where the total and target gains 
are inversely related and target and acquirer gains are inversely related as well. Finally, 
hubris driven acquisitions occur where managers make mistakes in evaluating target 
firms. In this instance target and total gains do not have any correlation whereas target 
and acquirer gains have a negative correlation. For our study, we primarily focus on 
agency driven and value maximizing transactions.  
                                               
24 Malatesta (1983) analyzes 336 completed mergers between 1969 and 1974 and finds that mergers are 
mainly motivated by agency which benefits only the target firms. By analyzing sample of 326 acquisitions 
between 1975 and 1987, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that managerial objective might be a 
contributing factor in reducing bidding firm values. 
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 As opportunities for informed insider trading has diminished due to early filing 
requirement and stricter penalties
25
, the safest way for the management to make money is 
to invest in positive NPV value-maximizing acquisitions. As such, we expect to see an 
increase in the proportion of synergy driven acquisitions after SOX. 
3.2.4 Governance, information asymmetry and acquisitions 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) introduced some of the most sweeping changes in 
governance structures of publicly owned corporations. Although some researchers argue 
that a "one-size-fits-all" model of governance cannot work, there is increasing evidence 
that good governance practices affect firm value.  Using a 'Governance Index'
26
 or G-
Index, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) show that firms with stronger shareholder 
rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital 
expenditure, and fewer corporate acquisitions.  
 Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find that enactment of SOX had a significant 
impact on firm value; they report that firms that were less compliant with the corporate 
governance rules prior to SOX showed greater improvement in firm value after SOX, 
compared to their more compliant counterparts. This implies that we are likely to observe 
                                               
25 By comparing stock price responses around takeover announcements between a relatively stronger 
(1989–1991) and a relatively weaker (1982–1984) regulatory regime, Boardman et al. (1998) find evidence 
that insiders associated with acquiring firms sought fewer but more profitable takeovers after the effective 
tightening of regulation, possibly to compensate them for the reduction in the profit opportunities from 
illegal insider trading.  
26Bebchuk et al. (2009) using a similar but more compact index find similar results. Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) find that in addition to the indices used by Gompers et al (2003) and Bebchuk et al (2009), stock 
ownership of board members and CEO-Chair separation are significantly positively correlated with better 
future performance. Brown and Caylor (2006) develop a new index which includes two external and five 






 between the governance compliant and non-compliant firms to 
reduce in the post SOX regime.  
3.2.5 Our hypotheses 
 The effect of SOX on corporate acquisition activity could manifest in a number of 
ways.  First, we expect to find a decline in pre-acquisition insider trading activities after 
the passage of SOX. The information advantage is no longer there for insiders as SOX 
makes expedited filing mandatory.  In addition, the risk of getting litigated (and if 
convicted, the penalty), is much higher than before.  Consequently, we are likely to 
observe lower price run ups after SOX.  Acquisition announcements in the post-SOX 
period should, therefore, be more informative.  Second, with a focus on good governance 
practices and a more transparent disclosure environment, we expect a decline in 
acquisitions motivated by agency considerations while an increase in the number of 
acquisitions with synergy being the primary motive. Finally, if SOX is successful in 
initiating more synergy-driven acquisitions, we expect the post SOX acquiring firms to 
perform better post-acquisition than their pre SOX counterparts—at a minimum we 
expect less underperformance from post SOX acquirers. 
                                               
27 Hoechle et al (2012) analyze a large sample of firms between 1996 and 2005 and find that corporate 
governance is associated with less value destruction. Their findings signify that diversification discount 
could be lowered by implementing better corporate governance. 
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3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data selection and sample description 
 Our sample consists of 910 successful tender offers from January 1, 1996 through 
December 31, 2009 drawn from the SDC Platinum database. We only collected tender 
offers where the deal value was greater than or equal to $50 million. The insider trading 
data was collected from EDGAR for the same time period. The pre-SOX sample covers 
the period from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002 while the post-SOX period is from 
August 30, 2002 onwards. We exclude firms with insufficient or no data on stock returns 
on CRSP.  
[Table 3-1 here]  
 Table 3-1 presents a detailed breakdown of the number of successful tender offers 
for each of the 14 years. There were 656 acquisitions in the pre-SOX period with an 
average of 98 acquisitions per year and 254 acquisitions for the post-SOX period with an 
average of 35 acquisitions per year. The higher numbers in the pre period could be 
attributed to the economic boom in the ‘90s whereas the 2000’s has seen a systematic 




[Table 3-2 here]  
                                               
28Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) discusses the hike in merger activities in the ‘90s as well 
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 Table 3-2 provides some summary statistics about the acquiring and target firms, 
and the deals, for both the pre and post SOX periods. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix 1. Several points are worth mentioning. Firm sizes for both target and 
acquiring firms have increased in the post SOX period. Also, the acquirers have lower 
leverage and Tobin’s q in the post SOX time period. In addition, relative deal sizes are 
lower, premiums have increased, and as hypothesized, there are more synergy driven 
acquisitions in the post SOX period.  
3.3.2 Methodology 
3.3.2.1Tests for price-run up and announcement effects for target shareholders 
 If SOX was successful in diminishing the information gap between corporate 
insiders and investors and if it was successful in deterring the executives from placing 
informed insider trades, we should observe a decrease in the price run up in the target 
firms leading up to the announcement in the post SOX period
29
.  
 First, we compare the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) between the pre and 
post SOX target firms around the announcement date. We calculate CAR [-60, t] where 
t= -60 to +30 days, and t = 0 is the announcement date. Next, using the standard event 
study approach, we analyze the stock return behavior of the target firms around the 
announcement dates [t = -60 to t = +30 days]. We use different windows around the 
announcement date to get a clearer idea about the price run up and information leakage. 
                                               
29 Xu (2008) finds a similar trend after the passage of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984.  Jorion et 
al (2005) also finds that information content of credit ratings improved after Regulation FD of 2000. 
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 Next, we run cross sectional tests for the full sample. Our dependent variable is 
cumulative abnormal return around announcement date, CAR-1, +1. We analyze
30
 affects 
of target firm characteristics and deal characteristics on the dependant variable. Four 
different models are employed: (i) the first model uses a ‘SOX’ dummy variable (equals 
to one if the announcement date was after August 29, 2002, and zero otherwise); (ii) the 
second model uses the ‘SOX’ dummy along with operating income growth rate, firm 
size, leverage, operating performance, and Tobin’s q; (iii) the third model uses the ‘SOX’ 
dummy and premium, relative deal size, hostile (dummy), cash (dummy), and 
diversification (dummy); and (iv) the last model uses all the variables.  
CAR-1, +1 =  +  * SOX +  * Operating income growth rate +  * Firm size +  * 
Leverage +  *Operating performance +  * Tobin’s q +  * Premium +  * Relative 
deal size + * Hostile +  * Cash + * Diversification +    [3.1] 
3.3.2.2. Tests for announcement effects for acquirer shareholders 
 As noted previously, better alignment of management and shareholders’ interests 
in the post SOX period is likely to result in more synergy driven acquisitions. We 
compare the CAR   [-60, t] between the pre and post SOX acquiring firms around the 
announcement date where t = -60 to +30 days, and t = 0 is the announcement date. 
                                               
30Target firm characteristics variables we used are operating income growth rate (operating income is 
measured by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets; 
operating income growth rate is the average growth between years t=-3 and t=-1, for the target), firm size 
(log of book value of total assets), leverage (long term debt scaled by total assets), operating performance 
(earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets), and Tobin’s 
q (market value of assets over book value of assets). The deal characteristics variable we used are premium, 
relative deal size (transaction value reported in SDC platinum database scaled by acquirer market value), 
hostile dummy (one if the deal is reported as hostile in SDC platinum or zero otherwise), cash dummy (one 
if the deal is purely cash financed or zero otherwise), and diversification dummy (one if the target and the 




 Next, we run cross sectional tests for the full sample using eq [3.1]
31
 but this time 
the firm characteristics variables represent the acquirers.  
3.3.2.3. Tests for agency versus value maximizing acquisitions 
 We classify acquisitions either as synergy driven or agency driven using the 
approach in Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). They not only provide the simplest 
definition of the three types
32
 of mergers but also describe a very neat methodology to 
identify them based on correlations between target, acquirer, and total gains
33
.Based on 
the simplest definition, if the total, target, and acquirer gains are all positive then it is 
classified as a value-maximizing (synergy) merger, else it is an agency-driven merger. 
They also use the correlation between target gain and total gain and the correlation 
between target gain and acquirer gain as predictors of agency or synergy driven 
acquisitions. 
 Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) suggest that the agency motive is more likely to 
persist in mergers with negative total gain. They argue that target and total gains would 
be positively related in the positive total gain sample because of synergy motive, and 
negatively related in the negative total gain sample because of agency motive. We check 
                                               
31 Only exception is we do not use the control ‘premium’ for acquirer tests. 
32Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) describe synergy-driven, agency-driven, and hubris as the three types 
of mergers. 
33They calculate the cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date for both target and acquirer 
firms. Market model estimates for each firm are calculated using a maximum of 255 trading days of daily 
returns data beginning 127 days before the announcement of the first tender bid. Target gain is calculated 
by multiplying the CAR by the market value of target’s equity as of the end of six trading days prior to first 
announcement for the target minus the value of target shares held by the acquirer before the announcement. 
Likewise, the acquirer gain is calculated by multiplying the CAR by the market value of acquiring firm as 
of the end of six trading days prior to the first announcement made by the acquiring firm. The total gain is 
the sum of the target and acquirer gains. 
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the correlation between target and total gains, and target and acquirer gains—for both pre 
and post SOX periods—for the full sample as well as the positive total gain only and 
negative total gain only subsamples.  
Target Gain =  +  (Total Gain) +   [3.2] 
Target Gain =  +  (Acquirer Gain) +   [3.3] 
Here, estimates the correlation between target and total gains for equation [3.2], and the 
correlation between target and acquirer gains for equation [3.3]. is expressed in 
millions of dollars. If  is positive in equation [3.2] for the positive total gain subsample, 
it suggests that synergy is the primary motive for this subsample; if it is negative for the 
negative total gain subsample, it suggests that agency is the main motive for that 
subsample. The larger the magnitude of , the stronger will be the case for synergy or 
agency depending on the subsample in question. For example, larger positive  for the 
positive gain subsample means stronger evidence for synergy.  Both hubris and agency 
hypotheses imply a negative  for equation [3.3], i.e. a negative correlation between 
target and acquirer gains.  
3.3.2.4. Post acquisition performance 
 Post acquisition underperformance of acquiring firms has been well documented 
in the literature (Loughran and Vijh, 1997 for e.g.)
34
.  If SOX resulted in proportionately 
more synergy driven acquisitions, these transactions are likely to improve shareholder 
wealth gains in the long run or at least at a minimum less underperformance. We examine 
                                               
34 Agrawal et al. (1992) analyze a large sample of mergers and tender offers between 1955 and 1987 and 
find that acquiring firm shareholders suffer a loss of about 10% over the five year post-merger period. 
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both the post acquisition operating and stock return performances using the well-
established methodologies in this area. 
 Operating performance is measured as the return on assets (ROA) and return on 
sales (ROS)
35
. We analyzed the ratios for a six-year period starting from the year of the 
announcement to five years after the acquisition.  Tests are conducted using both industry 
and matched-firm benchmark portfolios. We also use the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Return (BHAR)
36
 approach to test for abnormal stock return performance in the long-run. 
We have used industry (2-digit SIC matching), book-to-market and firm size as our 
matching criteria.   
 We run some cross sectional tests for our operating performance measures. 
Following and expanding from Heron and Lie (2002) we use the following model
37
: 
Pi = 0 +  1*SOX (dummy) + 2* [Assets (target) / (Assets (target + acquirer))] +  
 3* M-B (acquirer) +  4* M-B (target) + 5* Same Industry (dummy) +   
 6*Delay +   
                                               
35 Barber and Lyon (1996) also use ROA and ROS as operating performance measures.ROA is the ratio of 
operating income scaled by total assets where operating income is measured as earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).  Likewise, ROS is measured as the ratio of operating 
income (EBITDA) scaled by sales revenue. 
36 As per Mitchell and Stafford (2000), BHAR would represent the abnormal returns from holding a long 
position in the event firms and a short position on the matching firms, vis-à-vis the difference between long 
positions in event and matched firms where event firms could be matched based on some firm 
characteristics.  An alternate approach is the Jensen’s alpha approach, also known as calendar time 
portfolio approach. Since this approach weights observations equally across time rather than firms, Kothari 
and Warner (2004) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue against using the Jensen’s alpha approach as it is 
more biased towards finding results consistent with market efficiency. 
37 The independent variables are: SOX dummy (equals to one if the announcement date was after August 
29, 2002, and zero otherwise), ratio of targets assets to target and acquirer combined assets (assets are book 
value of assets and at time t=-1), market-to-book for acquirer (at t=-1), market-to-book for target (at t=-1), 
same industry dummy (equals to one if 4-digit SIC matches, MSV 1990), and a delay variable (the time lag 
between the first announcement of a bid and the final acquisition of the target). 
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Here Pi represents the operating performance measures namely average 3-year ROA, 
average 5-year ROA, average 3-year ROS, and average 5-year ROS. 
 For all the performance tests, we analyze the full sample, and the same and 
different industry sub-samples for both the pre and post SOX periods. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Evidence on price run up and announcement effects on target shareholders 
 We begin first by examining the price run up and insider trading activity around 
the announcement of the acquisition. Cumulative abnormal returns and net insider 
purchases starting at t= -60 days are examined. 
[Figures 3-1 and 3-2 here] 
 Figure 3-1 shows that the pre-announcement abnormal returns decreased 
significantly in the post SOX period. These abnormal returns are more concentrated 
closer to the announcement date compared to the pre-SOX period.  For the pre-SOX 
sample, there is a clear upward drift in the returns several days prior to the 
announcement.  Figure 3-2 shows that the net insider purchase trades scaled by total 
market value of the target firms gain momentum from about 20 days before the 
announcement for the pre-SOX period while the same shift appears right before the 
announcement for the post-SOX period
38
. The evidence in Figures 3-1 and 3-2 provides 
                                               
38 These results are similar to Xu (2008) who examined the effect of ITSA. ITSA was a big step towards 
fairness followed by Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 and finally SOX in 2002. The ideal situation 
would to have no leakage at all before the announcement. We still observe a trace of run up in the post 
SOX sample which could be attributed to the market anticipation hypothesis.  
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strong support for the positive impact that SOX has had on reducing information 
asymmetry and the incentive of insiders to trade on private information by mandating a 
timelier filing of trades.  The announcements appear to be less anticipated than before 
and clearly more informative compared to the pre-SOX period.   
[Table 3-3 here]  
 Table 3-3 reports the results for the different event windows around the 
announcement date.  The CARs around the announcement date (CAR0,+1, CAR-1,+1 etc.) 
are larger in the post-SOX period while the pre announcement CARs (CAR-60,-30, CAR-
30,-10, CAR-10,-5 etc.) are significantly higher in the pre SOX period. The statute has clearly 
improved the information environment for investors. For example, the two-day 
announcement CAR0,+1 is higher in the post-SOX period by 10.75% with a significance 
level of 1%.The relative importance of price run ups has also significantly reduced in the 
post period(from 22.78% to 7.22%) and the difference is significant at the 1% level.  The 
loss of relevance of pre announcement return reinforces our earlier finding that 
information leakage has indeed reduced in the post SOX period.  
[Table 3-4 here]  
 The results for the cross-sectional analysis with the target abnormal returns  
(CAR-1,+1) as the dependent variable are reported in Table 3-4.  Independent variables 
include SOX (dummy); target characteristics such as operating income growth rate, firm 
size, leverage, operating performance, and Tobin’s q; and deal characteristics such as 
relative deal size, Hostile (dummy), Cash (dummy), and Diversification (dummy). The 
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significant positive coefficients for the SOX dummy across the four models robustly 
show that target shareholder returns have improved in the post period. We also find 
statistically significant evidence that shareholders of smaller target firms gain more in the 
post SOX period.  
3.4.2 Evidence on announcement effects on acquirer shareholders 
 Next, we analyze the impact of the announcement on acquirer shareholders by 
considering the cumulative abnormal returns for a period starting at t= -60 to t= +30.  
[Figure 3-3 here] 
 Figure 3-3 shows a clear upward drift in the cumulative abnormal returns for the 
post SOX acquirers which are in striking contrast to the downward drift for pre SOX 
acquirers.  This provides early evidence that acquisitions in the post Act period are 
predominantly value maximizing. Our hypothesis that SOX improved the information 
environment for investors through better and timelier disclosure and reduced the 
incentive of management to act on private information is substantiated by the evidence in 
Figure 3-3. This in turn supports the findings by Boardman et al. (1998) that insiders 
associated with acquiring firms sought fewer but more profitable takeovers after the 
effective tightening of regulation, possibly to compensate them for the reduction in the 
profit opportunities from illegal insider trading. 
[Table 3-5 here]  
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 Table 3-5 reports the event study results for acquiring firms. With the CARs 
around the announcement date significantly larger in the post Act period, once again the 
evidence clearly points in the direction of proportionately more wealth creating 
acquisitions in the post SOX period.  For example, the CAR-1,+1 is -1.06% and 0.29% 
(both statistically significant) for the pre and post periods respectively, and the difference 
between the two is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Similar results are 
obtained for the median CAR values for the same window as well.  The evidence in 
Table 3-5 further corroborates the trend observed in Figure 3-3.  
[Table 3-6 here]  
 The results for the cross-sectional analysis with the acquirer abnormal returns 
(CAR-1,+1) as the dependent variable are reported in Table 3-6.  Independent variables 
include SOX (dummy), acquirer characteristics such as operating income growth rate, 
firm size, leverage, operating performance, and Tobin’s q, and deal characteristics such 
as relative deal size, Hostile (dummy), Cash (dummy), and Diversification (dummy). The 
significant positive coefficients for the SOX dummy across the four models robustly 
show that acquirer shareholder returns have improved in the post period.  We also find 
statistically significant evidence that shareholders of smaller and high growth acquiring 
firms gain more in the post SOX period. None of the deal characteristics, however, are 
significant. 
 The results thus far strongly suggest that post SOX acquisitions are value 
maximizing transactions for shareholders. 
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3.4.3 Evidence on agency versus synergy acquisitions 
 We next turn to directly examining the acquisition motives. Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) define synergy driven mergers as positive NPV transactions i.e. the 
total gain as well as target and acquirer gains are positive. Following this simple 
definition, we find
39
 that 44% of the pre SOX transactions are synergy driven whereas 
54% of the post SOX ones are synergy driven. With diminished incentives for profiting 
on private information, fewer transactions in the post Act period are motivated by agency 
considerations. The majority of the acquisition deals appear to be positive NPV 
transactions.   
[Table 3-7 here] 
 Table 3-7 reports the results for regression equations [3.3] and [3.4], for the entire 
sample, and the positive and negative gain subsamples.  Results for both the pre and post 
SOX periods are presented. We find that the correlation estimate for target and total gain 
(is positive for the entire sample and the positive total gain subsample, and negative 
for the negative total gain subsample. All the s are statistically significant. These 
characteristics are true for both pre and post SOX datasets and are consistent with the 
findings in Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). For the positive total gain subsample,  is 
0.0154 for pre SOX and it is 0.295 for post SOX sample, both with statistical 
significance. The higher magnitude of for the post SOX sample signifies a stronger 
presence of synergy.  Synergy also dominates in the full sample for both pre (=0.004) 
                                               
39Refer to Synergy (dummy) on Table 3-2 (Summary Statistics) 
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and post SOX (=0.154) periods with the post SOX sample again having a higher 
magnitude for the correlation factor (implying more dominance of synergy driven 
acquisitions. 
 We also present results based on equation [3.4] which analyzes the correlation 
between target and acquirer gains. Once again results for the full sample and the positive 
and negative gain subsamples, for both pre and post SOX periods are presented. The 
estimates of  are only significant for the negative gain subsamples for pre (=-0.016) 
and post SOX periods (=-0.036). Based on these results, we cannot exclude the 
presence of hubris from the negative subsample and the full sample, but the positive 
subsample in the post period shows presence of synergy motive (=0.014) but with no 
statistical significance.  
 In summary, we find consistent evidence that synergy and value creation have 
become increasingly important in acquisition decisions after SOX. We cannot rule out the 
presence of hubris or agency from the transactions but at a minimum, we can state that 
synergy driven acquisitions have certainly increased in the post SOX period.  The Act 
appears to have achieved its intended objectives of minimizing agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders through ensuring better governance practices and timely 
disclosure of insider trades, among other things.   
3.4.4 Evidence on post acquisition performance 
 If indeed more acquisitions after SOX are motivated by shareholder wealth 
maximization considerations, we should observe better long-term performance, or at least 
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less underperformance, for acquiring firms after the Act.   In this section, we provide the 
results for both the long-run post-acquisition operating as well as stock return 
performance.  Both industry-adjusted and matched-firm adjusted benchmarks are 
employed in these tests. 
[Table 3-8 and 3-9 here]  
 Table 3-8 presents the results of the industry and matched firm adjusted post-
acquisition operating performance analysis for the acquiring firms. Matched non-event 
firms are selected based on industry (2-digit SIC), book-to-market, and size. Here we 
report return on assets (ROA) as our measure for operating performance. We will 
introduce return on sales (ROS) as a second measure in later tables. Results are reported 
for the full sample for each regime (pre- and post- SOX). We report pre- and post- SOX 
post-acquisition ROA as well as the difference in performances between the two regimes. 
We find that long term post-acquisition performances for acquirers after SOX are 
superior compared to their pre-SOX counterparts. For example, the average five-year 
post-acquisition industry and matched firm adjusted ROA for post SOX regime are 
significantly higher by 1.22% and 1.61% respectively. 
 Diversification discount is well-documented in the merger literature (Morck, 
Schleifer and Vishny, 1990; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Hoechle et al, 2012). Therefore, 
we repeat these tests for same industry and different industry subsamples. The results are 
qualitatively the same for both subsamples—post SOX post-acquisition performances for 
acquirers are better compared to the pre SOX period for both the subsamples. Results for 
the subsamples are available from the authors upon request. 
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 Table 3-9 reports the cross-sectional analysis with the long term performance 
measures (Average 3-year and 5-year ROA’s) as the dependent variables. Independent 
variables include SOX dummy, ratio of targets assets to target and acquirer combined 
assets, market-to-book for acquirer, market-to-book for target, same industry dummy, and 
a delay variable. The significant positive coefficients for the SOX dummy for all four 
models indicate that long term post-acquisition operating performance (ROA) of the 
acquirers has improved in the post SOX period. Consistent with Heron and Lie (2002), 
we also report that operating performance improves when firms with high growth 
opportunities acquire firms with low growth opportunities. It is to be noted that the same 
industry dummy has a significant positive coefficient meaning acquirers who buy targets 
within their own industry show better post-acquisition performance. These results are 
consistent with the literature that investigates focus versus diversification (vis-à-vis 
conglomerate) mergers (e.g. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Comment and Jarrell, 
1995 etc.) 
 We conclude from the post-acquisition ROA analysis that acquiring firms’ post-
acquisition performance has significantly improved in the post SOX period. These firms 
might be underperforming their industries in a few instances but the magnitude of 
underperformance has declined in the post SOX period. Moreover, acquiring firms 
outperformed their matched counterparts in the post-SOX period in the five years after 
the acquisition. This improvement could be credited to a higher proportion of synergy-
driven acquisitions that is apparent in the post SOX subsample. The regulation put in 
place by the SOX regime appears to be working towards aligning the interests of the 
acquirers’ management and shareholders.  
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[Tables 3-10 and 3-11 here]  
 Following Barber and Lyon (1996) we use return on sales (ROS) as a second 
measure for operating performance for robustness. Table 3-10 reports the post acquisition 
industry and matched-firm adjusted ROS for pre- and post- SOX samples. The results are 
qualitatively similar to that of ROA. Post SOX sample outperformed their pre SOX 
counterparts for both industry and matched firm adjusted cases. For example, average 
five year industry and matched firm adjusted ROS for post-SOX sample were higher by 
2.07% and 3.46% respectively (both with 5% significance). Table 3-11 reports the cross-
sectional analysis and the results are qualitatively similar to what we report for the ROA 
in Table 3-9. 
[Table 3-12 here]  
 We further investigate the post acquisition performance by computing the Buy-
and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) for the acquiring firms. Table 3-12 reports the 
stock return performance for the three and five year time periods after the acquisition. We 
find the results consistent with the operating performance analysis in the previous 
section. Acquiring firms in the post-SOX period consistently performed better than their 
pre SOX counterparts in the long term performance tests (three-year and five-year). For 
the full sample, and same and different industry subsamples, pre SOX acquirers 
underperformed their matched counterparts whereas post-SOX acquirers outperformed 
their matched counterparts. For the full sample, pre-SOX firms underperformed their 
matched firms by 18.12% (3-year) and 18.20% (5-year) whereas post-SOX firms 
outperformed their matched firms by 9.25% (3-year) and 2.29% (5-year).  For robustness 
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check, we divided our sample into quartiles based on relative deal size. We consistently 
find that post SOX subsamples outperform the pre SOX ones for each quartile.  Both 
panels in table 3-9 also show that the post SOX acquirers performed better irrespective of 
whether the acquisition was within the same industry or across two different industry 
segments.  In fact, the stronger results for the same industry acquisitions provide further 
evidence of synergy having become increasingly important as a motive for the 
acquisition.   
 Our results show that the overall post-acquisition performance of the acquiring 
firms has improved after the passage of SOX. These results are in contrast to the widely 
documented findings that acquiring firms do poorly compared to their industry matched 
peers.  The results of long-term performance further reinforce our previous findings that 
synergy has become an increasingly important motive for acquiring firm managements 
after SOX.  Although agency and hubris driven acquisitions have not disappeared, our 
evidence clearly indicates that the better information environment and better incentive 
alignment of management and shareholders after SOX have resulted in significant wealth 
gains for acquiring firm shareholders.   
3.5 Robustness Checks 
 We conducted several robustness checks to ensure that our results were not 
sample specific.  These results are not reported here for brevity but are available from the 




3.5.1 Regulation Fair Disclosure of 2000 
 Regulation Fair Disclosure (or Regulation FD) passed in October 2000 was 
believed to have reduced the information asymmetry between individual and institutional 
investors. This regulation basically revolutionized how corporate information is 
disseminated. Jorion et al. (2005) analyze the impact of Regulation FD and find that the 
information effect is higher in the post Regulation FD period. For robustness check, we 
only included the post Regulation FD sample as our pre SOX sample and compared it 
with the post SOX sample.  Our results remained qualitatively unchanged. 
3.5.2 IT Bubble of the last Millennium 
 Our pre SOX sample is no doubt influenced by the large number of acquisitions 
during the tech bubble in the late 1990’s. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) discuss 
the hike in merger activities in 1999 and 2000. We therefore excluded acquisitions from 
years 1999 and 2000 and repeated the analyses. Our overall short run and long run results 
qualitatively remained unchanged. 
3.5.3. Credit Crunch 
 By the end of 2007, the U.S. economy was officially in a recession. The post SOX 
sample could well have been influenced by the recession year transactions. Hence, we 
repeated our analyses after excluding tender offers from years 2008 and 2009. Again, our 




3.5.4 Sample year 1997 
 The relative deal size for the sample year 1997 (see Table 3-1) was much higher 
than the rest of the sample years. As a robustness check, we excluded transactions from 
1997 and repeated the analyses.  Our results continue to hold. 
3.5.5 All Events 
 For a comprehensive robustness check for macro events, we excluded years 1999 
and 2000 from the pre SOX sample, and years 2008 and 2009 from our post SOX sample. 
Our results still hold. 
3.5.6 Transaction Size 
 It is prominent in M&A literature that relative deal size is around 30% in most 
cases. We have excluded any transaction that has relative deal size greater than 30% and 
repeated our analyses and our results continue to hold. 
3.6. Conclusions 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a comprehensive legislation covering a broad 
spectrum of areas such as accounting standards, corporate governance, corporate 
disclosure and reporting of financial transactions. It has vastly increased the civil and 
criminal penalties for corporate wrongdoers and has given the SEC more tools than ever 
to bring the culprits to justice.  
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 Our study analyzes the impact of SOX on corporate acquisition activities using a 
large sample of completed tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We find that the 
passage of SOX has contributed to reducing informed insider trading around acquisition 
announcements. By analyzing abnormal returns around the announcement date, we find 
that SOX had a dampening effect on information leakage around these events. The event 
study results for target firms show that the price run up and the relative importance of 
price run up have significantly decreased after the enactment of SOX. An upward shift in 
abnormal returns around the announcement for acquirers appears to indicate greater 
investor confidence in acquisition decisions. 
 Our results also show that the proportion of synergy driven acquisitions have 
proportionately increased since the passage of SOX. Our evidence on post acquisition 
performance is consistent with this hypothesis.  We examine both the operating 
performance as well as the buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns over the five years after 
the acquisition and consistently find that post acquisition has improved in the post SOX 
period.  These results are robust to the benchmark used (industry-adjusted and matched-
firm based approaches).  In large part, we believe that this is the result of the greater 
thrust of the statute on better corporate governance practices, more transparency in 
reporting corporate information and more timely disclosure of financial transactions by 
insiders.   
 Although SOX has been criticized as being overly zealous in its compliance 
requirements, our paper suggests that it has been effective in improving the overall 
information environment in which firms operate.  Specifically with respect to corporate 
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acquisition activity, we find that investors have benefitted since the statute has 
diminished the incentives for agency driven acquisitions and increased the incentives for 
managers to pursue transactions that maximize shareholder wealth.   
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Chapter 4 - Impact of Canadian SOX from an Acquisition Perspective 
4.1. Introduction 
 United States Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
40
 (2002) in the aftermath 
of large scale corporate scandals in the turn of the century. This was the strictest law in 
the post war era. In order to create level playing field for the cross-listed Canadian firms 
and to boost investor confidence in the north of the border, Canada soon followed suit. 
Ontario Bill 198 (CSOX)
 41
 was passed in spring of 2003 by the Ontario legislature. This 
is one of the most comprehensive securities regulations passed in Canada. Though the 
Act had its flaws
42
, it covered a broad array of areas like accounting standards, 
transparency, corporate governance etc.  
 In this paper, we analyze the impact of CSOX on Canadian acquisition. As the 
Act has introduced sweeping reform in corporate governance and significantly increased 
penalties for corporate wrongdoings, we expect the announcement effects for acquisitions 
to be stronger in the post Act period. This is likely to result in less price run up for target 
                                               
40 This Act included provisions to promote independent auditing, increase executive responsibility of 
financial reporting, and improved internal control system. The Act was passed in July 30, 2002 and enacted 
on August 29, 2002. It has given enormous power to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
punish the wrongdoers. One of the most important provisions was to make insider trade filing mandatory 
within two business days. 
41 This Act is also known as CSOX or Canadian SOX. The full title is “An Act to implement Budget 
measures and other initiatives of the Government”, aka “Budget Measure Act”. The Act received Royal 
Assent on December 9, 2002 and went into effect on April 7, 2003.  
42 The Act did not address the insider trading filing delay requirement. It remained unchanged at 10 
calendar days whereas SOX in the US mandated a two business day filing requirement. But despite this 
flaw, we expect CSOX to have a positive impact on corporate acquisition activities in Canada considering 




shares around the announcement. Secondly, if the law was successful in bridging the gap 
between management and shareholders then shareholders are expected to show more 
confidence on the acquisition activities undertaken by the management. This in turn is 
likely to result in higher returns for acquirer shareholders around announcements. Finally, 
if the management is working in the best interests of the shareholders, if they are making 
good acquisition decisions, then we should observe better post acquisition performance 
by the acquirers, if not, then at least less underperformance. 
 Pre bid price run up in target firms is a commonly discussed phenomenon (Keown 
and Pinkerton, 1981). Empirical evidence is in plenty regarding insider trading around 
major corporate announcements (Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Damodaran and Liu, 1993; and 
Keown and Pinkerton, 1981). As long as the benefits outweigh the costs of getting 
punished, the insiders will engage in transactions based on private information
43
. As 
CSOX has introduced stricter penalties for corporate wrongdoings, we expect it to 
significantly reduce the incentives for corporate insiders to trade on private information. 
 Empirical research on corporate acquisitions has examined synergy, agency, and 
hubris as possible motives for acquisitions. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) introduce a 
simple methodology to identify the type of acquisition. They report that synergy driven 
acquisitions are undertaken for economic gains, agency driven ones are executed to profit 
the management, and hubris driven ones are mainly honest mistakes with no economic 
gains. As the Act has imposed more transparency, as it has reduced the incentive to trade 
                                               
43 Xu (2008) analyzes the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and shows that stricter regulations prevent 
insiders from trading on private information. Her results show that pre announcement abnormal returns 
decreased after the passage of Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. 
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on private information, as it is more likely to reduce the gap between management and 
shareholders’ interests, we are likely to observe a stronger influence of synergy on 
acquisition activities. 
 Also, it has been well-documented in the literature that acquiring firms 
underperform in the post acquisition period (Agrawal et al., 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 
1997). Empirical evidence abounds with respect to diversification discount (Laeven and 
Levine, 2007; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Hoechle et al, 2012). If CSOX was 
successful in aligning the interests of all the stakeholders then management would 
undertake good acquisition transactions and would most likely do a better job operating 
them in the post acquisition period. Therefore, we expect to see improvement in post 
acquisition operating performance or at minimum less underperformance.  
 In this paper, we examine the impact of CSOX on pre bid price run up, abnormal 
returns around announcements for targets and acquirers, takeover motive, and post 
acquisition operating performance for acquirers. Using a large Canadian sample of 
successful tender offers between 1996 and 2009, we find the following: (1) pre bid price 
run up situation is almost unchanged; the inaction in reducing the delay between insider 
trades and filing by CSOX most likely has contributed to this phenomenon; (2) abnormal 
returns for targets close to announcement dates are higher in the post CSOX period; (3) 
abnormal returns for acquirers for the same period are also higher post CSOX but when 
we control for deal and firm characteristics, the results do not hold; the Act most likely 
does not provide significant added benefit for the acquirer shareholders; (4) though the 
proportion of synergy driven acquisitions has not increased, the impact of synergy is 
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higher in the post CSOX transactions showing that the quality of transactions has 
improved; and finally, (5) the post acquisition operating performance has improved in the 
post CSOX period. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 4.2 discusses the 
existing theoretical and empirical literature; section 4.3 describes the data and research 
methodology; section 4.4 discusses the sample and the empirical results; and section 4.5 
concludes the study.   
4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1 Ontario Bill 198, “C-SOX” 
 The United States Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the summer 
of 2002, and it went into effect on August 29, 2002. This was the strictest regulation 
passed in the post war era. The SOX enforced number of sweeping reforms to ensure 
accountability, fairness, and transparency in corporate deals as well as improved 
corporate governance. It gave more power to the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 
by introducing harsher civil and criminal penalties for wrongdoers. In order to ensure 
fairness to the cross-listed Canadian firms and to enhance investor confidence, Canada 
soon followed suit. In Canada, each province implements its own security regulations. 
Our focus is the province of Ontario as the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) is situated 
under its jurisdiction and therefore, majority of the companies in Canada fall under 
Ontario regulations.  
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 Immediately after SOX was enacted in the United States, Ontario government 
proposed Bill 198 (C-SOX) titled “An Act to implement Budget measures and other 
initiatives of the Government”, also known as the “Budget Measure Act”. Following 
SOX, C-SOX introduced several sweeping changes to Ontario security laws to ensure 
better corporate governance and to bring more transparency to corporate deals and trades. 
The Act went into full effect on April 7, 2003 although it received Royal Assent on 
December 9, 2002. Like SOX, C-SOX has increased civil and criminal penalties for 
corporate wrongdoers. One of the striking differences between SOX and C-SOX is 
insider trade filing delay requirement—while SOX requires insiders to file within two 
business days, C-SOX did not change the existing Canadian rule of filing within 10 
calendar days
44
. As C-SOX has increased the penalties for corporate wrongdoings, it 
should deter informed insider trading
45
. Though the ten calendar day provision in Canada 
is still better than the pre-SOX situation in the United States
46
, it could still be an issue.  
4.2.2 Price run-up, information leakage and market anticipation 
 Significant price run-up and insider trades for target shares around acquisition 
announcement dates have been well-documented in the literature (Keown and Pinkerton, 
1981). Motivation for trade around acquisitions should be diminished in the post C-SOX 
period as a result of the enhanced penalties introduced by the Act.  
                                               
44 Ontario Securities Commission finally changed the filing requirements to 5 calendar days starting on 
November 1, 2010 
45 Bhabra and Hossain (2012) analyze insider trades by corporate officers between 1996 and 2009 and find 
that SOX has been able to improve informativeness of insider filings. They find timelier filing requirement 
of SOX to be one of the contributing factors to this improvement. 
46 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 mandated a two business day filing delay requirement which is a 
drastic change from a previous allowable delay of up to 40 calendar days. 
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 Keown and Pinkerton (1981) find that information leakage and insider trading 
take place before the announcement date. But they also state that semi-strong form 
efficiency hold and therefore all the market reaction is realized by the day after the 
announcement.  
 The market anticipation hypothesis contends that investors use a number of 
publicly available information sources to decipher important events prior to public 
announcement, with share prices impacted to reflect updated beliefs (e.g., Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983). The establishment of a large share position in a firm (Jarrell and Poulsen, 
1989), the publication of takeover rumors (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989), or the passage of 
merger-related banking regulation (Becher, 2009) can also signal impending takeovers. 
4.2.3 Motives for Acquisitions 
 Three different types of acquisitions are discussed by Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993), namely synergy, agency, and hubris driven acquisitions. By analyzing 330 tender 
offers between 1963 and 1988, they conclude that synergy driven takeovers are those 
where target, acquirer, and total gains are all positive and are positively correlated with 
each other; agency driven acquisitions are defined by a negative correlation between 
target and total gains, and target and acquirer gains; hubris is defined by management 
mistakes where target and total gains have no correlation whereas target and acquirer 
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gains have negative correlation. In this paper, we mainly focus on synergy or value 
maximizing, and agency driven transactions
47
. 
 As stricter regulation like CSOX is most likely to decrease
48
 benefits from insider 
trading, the best way for management to make money is to engage in synergy driven 
acquisitions. This could mean an increase in value maximizing transactions resulting in a 
better post-acquisition performance. Diversification discount is well-documented in the 
literature (Laeven and Levine, 2007 e.g.). Since we are likely to note a better alignment 
between management and shareholder interests, we expect to see a decline in 
diversification transactions. 
4.2.4 Canadian Sample 
 As Canadian firms receive a preferential treatment in US Stock exchanges, it was 
important that the Canadian tighten up their house following the passage of SOX
49
. It was 
also needed in order to ensure a level playing ground for the cross-listed Canadian firms 
who were already required to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States. 
The shareholder structure within the corporations is also different in Canada—about one 
fifth of Canadian companies listed under TSX have a controlling shareholder; Canadians 
firms are also known for issuing restricted or subordinated voting share which is a rarity 
in the US. As Canadian regulators and legislators have often times followed suit of their 
                                               
47 Malatesta (1983) analyzes 336 completed mergers between 1969 and 1974 and reports that mergers are 
primarily agency motivated and that these transactions only benefit target shareholders. 
48 Boardman et al (1998) reports that insiders associated with acquiring firms sought fewer but more 
profitable takeovers after the effective tightening of regulations. 
49 “CANADIAN RESPONSE TO THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: NEW DIRECTIONS 
FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE”, by Tara Gray, Economic Division, October 4, 2005 
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southern neighbors, it is famously known that the Canadian regulators are much softer on 
enforcing their security laws. Critics of C-SOX opposed the US way of regulating and 
argued that a principle-based regulatory environment should be more appropriate for 
Canada as it will prevent executives to look for “loopholes” like their neighbors in the 
south. 
4.2.5 Hypothesis 
 The effect of C-SOX could be observed in various ways. Though the unchanged 
insider filing requirement of ten days could be troublesome, the increased penalties 
enforced by the Act will most likely deter the insiders from trading on private 
information. First, we expect the pre bid price run-ups to decline in the post C-SOX 
period since the penalties for informed insider trading has increased significantly. 
Second, as the Act has tightened up the loose ends on corporate governance and imposed 
more penalties for insider wrongdoings, we are more likely to observe less opportunistic 
trades around acquisition announcements resulting in the announcements events to be 
more informative for both targets and acquirers.  Third, we expect synergy driven 
acquisitions to go up as C-SOX has enforced better corporate governance and more 
transparency. Finally, if C-SOX is successful in generating more value-maximizing 
acquisitions, if the better corporate governance measures work to mitigate agency 
problems, we will most likely observe the acquiring firms to show better operating 
performance post-acquisition, or at minimum less underperformance. 
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4.3. Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data selection and sample description 
 Our sample consists of successful Canadian tender offers collected from SDC 
Platinum database covering dates from January 1, 1996 through December 31, 2009. The 
data consists of transactions where both target and acquirer are Canadian. Since C-SOX 
was enacted by Ontario legislature, and only covers companies that are listed on TSX, the 
sample includes TSX listed targets and acquirers only. Our sample consists of 238 
completed Canadian tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is 
greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and 
Canadian and have stock returns and financial data available from Canadian Financial 
Markets Research Center (CFMRC) and Compustat respectively; (3) no cross-listed 
companies were included since they will be impacted by the US-SOX anyways. Pre 
CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to April 6, 2003; 
and for post CSOX sample the dates are from April 7, 2003 onwards.  
[Table 4-1 here] 
 Table 4-1 provides a detailed breakdown of the number of completed tender 
offers between 1996 and 2009. There were a total of 159 transactions in the pre CSOX 
period for a time span of little over 8 years; on the other hand 79 acquisitions were 
completed in the post CSOX period covering about 6 years. It is to be noted that same 
industry acquisitions have also increased in the post CSOX period (49.7% for pre CSOX 
v. 62% for post CSOX). A particular hike in acquisitions in the late ’90s could be 
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attributed to the economic boom during that period. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) mentions the hike in merger activities in the late 1990s.  
[Table 4-2 here] 
 This table provides some summary statistics about the acquiring and target firms, 
and the deals. The definition of the variables is provided in Appendix 2. We would like to 
mention some key points—both acquirer and targets carry higher leverage, and better 
operating performance; in addition, premiums have increased, no significant change in 
synergy driven acquisitions, and there are less diversification transactions in the post C-
SOX era. 
4.3.2 Methodology 
4.3.2.1 Tests for pre bid price run up and announcement effects for target shareholders 
 Pre bid price run ups in target firms have been observed throughout the history of 
mergers and acquisitions (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Bhabra and Hossain, 2012). 
Using standard event study methodology, we analyze the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) of target firms around announcement dates, starting from t=-60 days to t=30 days, 
for both pre- and post- CSOX samples. We use different event windows within this time 
frame to get a clearer picture of the price run ups and information leakage in the target 
firms.  
 Next, we undertake some cross-sectional regression analysis where cumulative 
abnormal return around announcement date, CAR-1,+1 is the dependent variable. We 
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control for a CSOX dummy (equals to one if the announcement date was after April 6, 
2003, and zero otherwise), some target firm characteristics
50
 like firm size, leverage, and 
free cash flow, and some deal characteristics
51
 like relative deal size, premium, ‘Hostile’ 
dummy, and ‘Cash’ dummy. 
 CAR-1, +1 =  +  *C SOX +  * Firm size +  * Leverage +  * Free cash 
flow +    * Relative deal size +    * Premium +  * Hostile +  * Cash +   [4.1] 
4.3.2.2 Tests for announcement effects for acquirer shareholders 
 As we are expecting CSOX to be better able to align management and 
shareholders’ interests, the management will most likely engage in more synergy driven 
transactions. If the investors are confident that the management is working in their best 
interest, we should observe an increase in cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for acquirer 
shareholders around the announcement dates. Using similar event study and cross-
sectional analysis as discussed in the previous section for targets, we test the impact of 
announcements for acquirer shareholders. The cross sectional equation remains the same 
as eq [4.1]; only exception is that we do not control for the premium. 
4.3.2.3 Tests for synergy versus agency driven acquisitions 
 We use the Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) methodology to identify synergy 
and agency driven transactions. Based on their simpler definition if the target, acquirer, 
and total gains are all positive then the corresponding transaction is a synergy driven one 
                                               
50 Firm size (log of total assets), leverage (long term debt scaled by total assets), and free cash flow 
(EBITDA scaled by total assets) 
51 Deal size (transaction value scaled by acquirer’s market value), premium (as reported on SDC platinum), 
‘Hostile’ dummy (equals to one if the deal was flagged as hostile in SDC Platinum), and payment method 
dummy ‘Cash’ (equals to one if the deal was an all cash transaction) 
73 
 
or else it is agency driven. In a more robust method, they classify the transactions little 
differently—if target, acquirer, and total gains are all positive and have positive 
correlation between each other then it is synergy driven transaction; for agency driven 
acquisitions target and total gain and target and acquirer gain are all negatively 
correlated. They insist that agency motive is more prevalent in acquisitions with negative 
total gain whereas synergy is more common for positive total gain transactions. 
Following their methodology, we check the correlation between target and total gain, and 
target and acquirer gain, for both the positive and negative gain subsamples as well as for 
the full sample.  
Target Gain =  +  (Total Gain)   [4.2] 
Target Gain =  +  (Acquirer Gain)  [4.3] 
Here is the correlation coefficient for each equation. The higher the magnitude of , the 
stronger the presence of synergy or agency motive depending on the sample. For 
example, if we are analyzing a positive total gain subsample then higher value of for 
equation [4.2] would mean a stronger presence of synergy and vice versa.  
4.3.2.4 Post acquisition operating performance  
 It has been well-documented in the literature that acquiring firms underperform in 
the post-acquisition period (Agrawal et al, 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997 etc.). If CSOX 
has resulted in a better alignment of management and shareholders’ interests, if that 
results in more synergy driven transactions then we will most likely observe a better 
performance by the acquiring firms in the post acquisition period, if not then at least less 
underperformance. Following Barber and Lyon (1996) we use Return on Assets (ROA) 
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and Return on Sales (ROS) as operating performance measures. ROA is operating 
income scaled by total assets where operating income equals earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Similarly, ROS is operating income scaled by 
sales. We conduct all the ratio analysis on an industry-adjusted basis.  
 Following and expanding from Heron and Lie (2002) we run some cross sectional 
tests for the ROA and ROS measures
52
: 
Pi = 0 +  1*CSOX (dummy) + 2* [Assets (target) / (Assets (target + acquirer))] +  
 3* M-B (acquirer) +  4* M-B (target) + 5* Same Industry (dummy) +   
 6*Delay +   
Here Pi represents the operating performance measures namely average 3-year ROA, 
average 5-year ROA, average 3-year ROS, and average 5-year ROS. 
4.4. Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Evidence on pre bid price run up and announcement effects on target 
shareholders 
 We first examine pre bid price run up around the acquisition announcement dates. 
We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from t = -60 days to t = +30 days 
where t=0 is the announcement date.  
[Figure 4-1 and Table 4-3 go here] 
                                               
52 The independent variables are: CSOX dummy (equals to one if the announcement date was after April 6, 
2003, and zero otherwise), ratio of targets assets to target and acquirer combined assets (assets are book 
value of assets and at time t=-1), market-to-book for acquirer (at t=-1), market-to-book for target (at t=-1), 
same industry dummy (equals to one if 4-digit SIC matches, MSV 1990), and a delay variable (the time lag 
between the first announcement of a bid and the final acquisition of the target). 
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 Figure 4-1 shows that the pre announcement abnormal returns are lower in the 
post CSOX period for the most part but the upward drift starts around the same time 
period before the announcement for both pre and post CSOX regimes. It appears that the 
tightening of regulations has some impact on the information leakage front but the lack of 
action on timelier filing requirement is apparent through the continuing pre 
announcement upward drift in the post CSOX period. Table 4-3 reports the event study 
results for different windows around the acquisition announcement dates. Our results 
show that the Act clearly made some improvements. The CARs around announcement 
dates, e.g. CAR0,+1, CAR-1,+1, CAR-1,0, and CAR-5,0 are all significantly higher for the post 
CSOX period. For example, the two day announcement CAR0,+1 is 7.87% higher with 1% 
significance for the post CSOX period. 
[Table 4-4 here] 
 Table 4-4 presents the cross sectional results with CAR-1,+1 as the dependent 
variable. We find that the CSOX dummy is positive across all four models with statistical 
significance which means that the target shareholders returns have improved in the post 
CSOX period. These results are consistent with our event study findings. The higher 
returns around announcement in the post CSOX period indicate that the Act was able to 
have a positive impact in reducing information leakage around announcements. At the 
same time, it is also true that the inaction in reducing the delay between insider trades and 
filing by CSOX most likely has contributed to the lack of improvement in earlier pre 
announcement jump in CARs apparent in Figure 4-1.  
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4.4.2 Evidence on announcement effects on acquirer shareholders 
  Next, we analyze the impact of acquisition announcements on acquirer 
shareholders by examining the CARs around announcements [from t = -60 days to t = 
+30 days where t=0 is the announcement date].  
[Figure 4-2 and Table 4-5 here] 
 Figure 4-2 shows a clear upward drift for both pre and post CSOX shareholder 
returns before announcement. Even though the magnitude is smaller than what we find 
for targets, the CARs around announcement dates, e.g. CAR0,+1, CAR-1,+1, CAR-1,0, and 
CAR-5,0 are all significantly higher for the post CSOX period. For example, the two day 
announcement CAR0,+1 is 0.17% higher with 5% significance for the post CSOX period. 
These results show that investors are showing more confidence on the acquisition 
activities undertaken by the management. Even though the results are not as striking as 
Bhabra and Hossain (2012) which analyze the impact of SOX on US acquisition 
activities, they show traces of improvement. This implies that CSOX was able to align 
stakeholder interests even though it lacked timelier filing requirement like its American 
counterpart. In order to be fair to CSOX, we should not expect a drastic impact like that 
of SOX in the United States because there the delay came down from 40 calendar days to 
two business days whereas in Canada the delay requirement was 10 calendar days to 
begin with—had CSOX addressed the delay issue, it would not have brought in the 
striking improvement like in the US sample as reported in Bhabra and Hossain (2012). 
 [Table 4-6 here] 
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 Next, we report the results from the cross sectional analysis with CAR-1,+1 as the 
dependent variable. We use almost the same sets of controls as we do for the target return 
analysis, i.e. CSOX dummy and some firm (firm size, leverage, and free cash flow) and 
deal characteristics (relative deal size, hostile dummy, and cash dummy) variables. The 
CSOX dummy is positive and significant for Model I, but when we control for other 
factors in Models II to Model IV, it does not show any statistical significance. Therefore, 
we cannot conclude that the Act actually had a significant positive impact on acquirer 
shareholders.  
 In conclusion of this section, we can say that the event study results show some 
trace of improvements in the post CSOX period but the results do not hold once we 
control for other firm and deal characteristics. In summary, the Act most likely does not 
provide as much significant added benefit for acquirers as it did for targets. 
4.4.3 Evidence on agency versus synergy acquisitions 
 Following Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), we analyze the acquisition motives 
for the transactions. We do not find any significant change in synergy driven 
acquisitions
53
 while considering the simplest definition of acquisition motive. The slight 
majority of transactions still appear to be agency driven. 
[Table 4-7 here] 
                                               




 Table 4-7 reports the correlations between target and total gains, and target and 
acquirer gains, for full sample, and positive and negative total gain subsamples. We find 
that correlation between target and total gains are positive for full sample and positive 
total gain subsample and that it is true for both pre and post CSOX periods. This signifies 
that synergy is dominant within those two samples. We also find that the magnitudes of 
correlation () are higher for the post CSOX period (=0.043 and =0.66 for pre and post 
CSOX full sample respectively). A higher magnitude of the correlation factor signifies 
more dominance of synergy (BN 1993). We observe similar stronger presence for the 
post CSOX sample within the positive total gain subsample as well. We also present 
correlations between target and acquirer gains, none of which are statistically significant. 
We cannot exclude the possibility of the presence of hubris from our sample. 
 In summary, we find that the presence of synergy is apparently more dominant in 
the post CSOX sample. This could be a result of more better-quality vis-à-vis value 
maximizing acquisitions undertaken by the management; or this could also be an 
outcome of a decline in diversification or conglomerate transactions. As we cannot rule 
out the presence of hubris or agency from the sample, at minimum we can assert that 
CSOX has provided some improvement in bridging the gap between shareholder and 
management interests. This improvement could be attributed to better governance and 
stricter penalties imposed by the Act. It is our opinion that a better outcome could have 




4.4.4 Evidence on post acquisition operating performance 
 Post acquisition underperformance is a widely noted phenomenon in finance 
literature. If CSOX was successful in motivating management to work in the best 
interests of the shareholders, we will most likely observe an improvement in the post 
acquisition operating performance of the acquiring firms or at least less 
underperformance.  
[Table 4-8 here] 
 Table 4-8 reports the post acquisition long term operating performance for the 
acquiring firms. We present industry adjusted return on assets (ROA) for a total of six 
year time period starting from the year of the acquisition. We find that both the pre and 
post CSOX sample underperform their respective industries over three and five year 
periods but the post CSOX sample shows less underperformance compared to its pre 
CSOX counterpart. For example, average three year ROA is higher for the post CSOX 
sample by 1.7% with 5% significance; the average five year ratio shows similar trend. It 
has been well-known that firms that acquire other firms for the purpose of diversification 
show poor post acquisition performance (MSV, 1990; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Hoechle 
et al, 2012). Therefore, we repeat all the performance tests for same and different 
industry subsample and the results do not change qualitatively. We also repeat all these 
performance tests using ROS (return on sales). The results are qualitatively same as the 
ROA ones. We do not report those for brevity. Results will be provided from the author 
upon request.  
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 Panel B reports the cross-sectional analysis with long term industry adjusted ROA 
as the dependent variables. We control for CSOX dummy, ratio of targets assets to target 
and acquirer combined assets, market-to-book for acquirer, market-to-book for target, 
same industry dummy, and a delay variable. It is to be noted that the CSOX dummy is 
positive and significant for both models meaning long term post-acquisition operating 
performance (ROA) of the acquirers has improved in the post CSOX period. Again, we 
ran the same tests for ROS measures and the results were qualitatively similar. Hence we 
do not report them for brevity. 
 We conclude from this section that acquiring firms’ operating performances have 
improved in the post CSOX period. Although they might be underperforming their 
respective industries but the magnitude of underperformance has significantly dropped. 
As mentioned earlier, we do not find any change in the proportion of synergy driven 
acquisitions between the two regimes; but we do find that the post CSOX sample 
experienced less diversification transactions. This could direct towards a better alignment 
of stakeholders’ interests which could very well be an outcome of implementation of 
stricter penalties and good governance by CSOX. 
4.4.5 Robustness checks 
 IT bubble in the last millennium is a commonly known phenomenon. Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) discusses the hike in merger activities in 1999 and 2000. 
We exclude those years from our sample and run all the tests. The results did not change 
qualitatively. For our operating performance test, we analyze ROA and ROS for the post 
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acquisition period for the same and different industry subsample and the results still hold 
qualitatively.  
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
 Ontario Bill 198 or CSOX of 2003 is a reactionary Act to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 of the United States. This Act covered a broad array of corporate regulations 
covering accounting standards, corporate governance, and financial disclosures. As 
Canada was known for lighter civil and rarely any criminal penalties for corporate 
wrongdoings, this Act is a complete turnaround from that. Though this Act has many 
good provisions, we find that the lack of timelier filing requirement for insider trades is a 
significant drawback. In fairness to CSOX, the existing Canadian requirement of 10 
calendar days is much better than pre-SOX requirement of up to 40 calendar days in the 
United States, and therefore a tightening of delay requirement to two business days in 
Canada probably would not have produced a striking improvement as reported in Bhabra 
and Hossain (2012) for the US sample.  
 In this study we analyze Canadian successful tender offers between 1996 and 
2009 where the target and acquirers are both Canadian and TSX listed. Our results show 
that CSOX has contributed incrementally in the area of corporate acquisitions. The event 
study results for the target firms show that the Act was able to marginally reduce 
information leakage. At the same time, it is also true that the inaction in reducing the 
delay between insider trades and filing by CSOX most likely has contributed to the 
persisting earlier pre announcement jump. Similarly, higher cumulative abnormal returns 
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for acquirer shareholders around announcements show that investors are showing more 
confidence on the acquisition activities undertaken by the management. 
 Though we do not find any significant change in the proportion of synergy driven 
acquisitions between the two regimes, the post CSOX acquiring firms demonstrate less 
post-acquisition underperformance. This implies that the improvement in performance is 
most likely the result of better alignment of management and shareholders’ interests 
through implementation of stricter penalties and good governance. 
 Finally, before CSOX was enacted, both the academic and practitioner worlds 
were divided on the question of its necessity. We also find that the results are definitely 
not as strong as Bhabra and Hossain (2012) that find stronger evidence in favor of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act; but at minimum the results imply that CSOX was the right move in 
the right direction proved by incremental improvement found in some of the results. We 
strongly believe that a timelier filing requirement like SOX would have done a better job. 
As Ontario Securities Commission finally changed the filing requirements to five 
calendar days on November 1, 2010, we believe that will bring added benefit to CSOX, 
and most likely we will see stronger results as a consequence. For future work, it will be 
interesting to examine how big of an impact the governance measures had on the 
acquisition activity. We also think that the compensation structure for the executives will 
be more aligned to the shareholders interest. It has been reported in the literature that 
companies that allocate higher equity based compensation fair well in corporate 
acquisitions (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, Raman, 2001). It will be really interesting to see if 
there was a greater shift towards equity based compensation after the enactment of CSOX 
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and if the gap between post acquisition performance of low and high equity based 
compensation companies has narrowed or not. 
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Chapter 5 – Major Findings, Implications, and Directions for Future 
Research 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) was the strictest corporate regulations passed in 
the history of the United States. The Act was passed to regain the confidence of the 
investors by implementing tighter corporate governance, financial and accounting 
provisions. This is a significant regulatory improvement aimed at enhancing transparency 
and reducing information asymmetry between insiders and investors. The Act created a 
level playing field for all. Regulation Fair Disclosure of 2000 was a first step in the right 
direction and SOX of 2002 brought the diverse changes needed to ensure greater 
transparency.  
 In the first essay, we analyzed if the information content of insider trading 
transactions changed under the stricter disclosure regulations introduced by SOX. We find 
that information content of these filings indeed improved in the post SOX period and 
firms with more information asymmetry and larger trades convey more information in 
general.  We also find that the rank of the insider is an important determinant in the 
information conveyed by the filing. Our results show that while the information 
environment has improved for investors in the post- SOX period overall, insider filings 
are particularly important for firms with larger levels of information asymmetry to begin 
with. These findings are very important as they show that SOX has successfully brought 




 In the second essay, we examine the impact of SOX on mainly three facets of 
corporate acquisitions, namely pre-announcement price run up in target companies, 
motivation for acquisitions, and post-acquisition long-term performance. We find that the 
pre-announcement price run ups in target firms have decreased. This is major findings as 
it reinforces the argument that SOX has brought greater transparency to the market. As 
there is more transparency, we observe less information leakage and therefore, smaller 
run ups. We still cannot ignore the presence of market anticipation but at least SOX has 
put some control on information leakage. Finally, we not only find that synergy has a 
stronger presence in the post SOX period but also observe better post-acquisition long 
term performance in the post SOX sample. These results are significant as they direct to a 
better alignment of shareholder and management interests—this was one of the main 
goals of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This vouches for the stricter corporate governance 
measures put in place by the Act. 
 The final essay basically replicates the analysis of the second essay with a 
Canadian perspective. Ontario Bill 198 or CSOX of 2003 is a reactionary Act to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 of the United States. We find that target shareholders were 
slightly benefited, and synergy had a stronger presence after CSOX but the acquiring 
shareholders did not rip a short term benefits. However, we find that the acquiring firms 
in the post CSOX sample were showing better long term post-acquisition performance 
than their pre CSOX counterparts. We conclude that the Canadian SOX might not be as 
strict as the US-SOX, but it definitely is the right step in the right direction contrary to the 
beliefs of many Canadian practitioners and some academicians. 
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 For future work, it will be interesting to examine how big of an impact the 
governance measures had on the insider trading filings or on corporate acquisitions. 
Another interesting area could be analyzing the compensation structure of the 
corporations. We think that the compensation structure for the executives will be more 
aligned to the shareholders interest. It has been reported in the literature that companies 
that allocate higher equity based compensation fair well in corporate acquisitions (Datta 
et al. 2001). It will be really interesting to see if there was a greater shift towards equity 
based compensation after the enactment of SOX in USA or CSOX in Canada or if the gap 
between post acquisition performance of low and high equity based compensation 












APPENDIX 1 – Variable Definition for Chapter 3 




Acquirer gain Following Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), the acquirer gain is calculated 
by multiplying the cumulative abnormal return by the market value of 
acquiring firm as of the end of six trading days prior to the first 
announcement made by the acquiring firm. 
Cash (dummy) One if the deal is purely cash financed or zero otherwise 
Delay The time lag between the first announcement of a bid and the final 
acquisition of the target 
Different industry The 4-digit SIC for target and acquirer are not same 
Diversification (dummy) One if the target and the acquirer have different 4-digit SIC codes and zero 
otherwise 
Firm size Log (book value of total assets) 
Hostile (dummy) One if the deal is reported as hostile in SDC platinum or zero otherwise 
Leverage Long term debt scaled by total assets 
Matched firm Event firm matched with a non-event firm based on 2-digit SIC, B-M, and 
size 
Operating income growth rate Operating income is measured by earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, 
and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets. Operating income growth 
rate is the average growth between years t=-3 and t=-1, for the acquirer. 
Operating performance Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
scaled by total assets. Operating performance presented in Table 2 is for year 
t = -1. 
Premium Percent premium paid to target based on the price on the day before the 
announcement 
Relative deal size Transaction value reported in SDC platinum database scaled by acquirer 
market value 
Sales Year ending sales figure reported in Compustat for t=-1 year 
Same industry The 4-digit SIC for target and acquirer are same 
SOX (dummy) One if the announcement date was after August 29, 2002, and zero otherwise 
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Synergy (dummy) One if both target and acquirer gains are positive and zero otherwise 
Target gain Following Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), target gain is calculated by 
multiplying the cumulative abnormal return around announcement by the 
market value of target’s equity as of the end of six trading days prior to first 
announcement for the target minus the value of target shares held by the 
acquirer before the announcement.  
Tobin's q Market value of assets (total book value of assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity) over book value of assets 
Total gain We use the Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) method to calculate the target 
and acquirer gains. The total gain is the sum of the target and acquirer gains. 















APPENDIX 2 – Variable Definition for Chapter 4 
 




Acquirer gain Following Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), the acquirer gain is calculated 
by multiplying the cumulative abnormal return by the market value of 
acquiring firm as of the end of six trading days prior to the first 
announcement made by the acquiring firm. 
Cash (dummy) One if the deal is purely cash financed or zero otherwise 
CSOX (dummy) One if the announcement date was after April 6, 2003, and zero otherwise 
Delay The time lag between the first announcement of a bid and the final 
acquisition of the target 
Diversification (dummy) One if the target and the acquirer have different 4-digit SIC codes and zero 
otherwise, MSV (1990) 
Firm size Log (book value of total assets) 
Hostile (dummy) One if the deal is reported as hostile in SDC platinum or zero otherwise 
Leverage Long term debt scaled by total assets 
Operating performance (ROA)  Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
scaled by total assets. Operating performance presented in Table 2 is for year 
t = -1. 
Premium Percent premium paid to target based on the price on the day before the 
announcement 
Relative deal size Transaction value reported in SDC platinum database scaled by acquirer 
market value 
Sales Year ending sales figure reported in Compustat for t=-1 year 
Synergy (dummy) One if both target and acquirer gains are positive and zero otherwise 
Target gain Following Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993), target gain is calculated by 
multiplying the cumulative abnormal return around announcement by the 
market value of target’s equity as of the end of six trading days prior to first 
announcement for the target minus the value of target shares held by the 
acquirer before the announcement.  
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Total gain We use the Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) method to calculate the target 
and acquirer gains. The total gain is the sum of the target and acquirer gains. 
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TABLES and FIGURES 
Table 2-1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports some descriptive statistics about our sample. The sample for this study consists of all the insider transactions 
from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. The transactions were collected from EDGAR. Pre SOX transactions represent 
dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002, and post SOX from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We exclude firms 
with insufficient or no data on CRSP. TradeSize is the ratio of transaction amount to market cap on the day of the filing. 
Transaction amount represents average dollar amount tied to each of the filing. Dividend Yield equals cash dividend to price 
ratio. Market-to-Book equals the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. Market cap equals the market 
capitalization of the company on the day of the filing. R&D equals the R&D expenditure scaled by net sales. ROA is latest return 
on assets available through Compustat. 
Panel A: Purchase Sample 
Variable 
N MEAN   MEDIAN   
Pre SOX Post SOX Pre SOX Post SOX 
p-value for 
difference Pre SOX Post SOX 
p-value 
for diff. 
Trade Size  743 4,483 0.0728% 0.0170% <0.01 0.0023% 0.0010% <0.01 
Transaction 
Amount  743 4,483 490,022 492,733 <0.01 63,558 65,064 <0.01 
Delay  743 4,483 29 1.63 <0.01 21 1 <0.01 
Panel B: Sales Sample 
Variable 
N MEAN   MEDIAN   
Pre SOX Post SOX Pre SOX Post SOX 
p-value for 
difference Pre SOX Post SOX 
p-value 
for diff. 
Trade Size 1,439 37,121 0.1752% 0.0193% <0.01 0.0337% 0.0058% <0.01 
Transaction 
Amount  1,439 37,121 9,679,576 1,892,463 <0.01 591,823 132,895 <0.01 
Delay  1,439 37,121 30 2.1 <0.01 24 2 <0.01 
Panel C: Full Sample 
Variable 
N MEAN   MEDIAN   
Pre SOX Post SOX Pre SOX Post SOX 
p-value for 
difference Pre SOX Post SOX 
p-value for 
diff. 
DivYld (%) 2,182 41,604 0.48 0.44 <0.01 0.25 0.21 <0.01 
Market-to-Book 2,182 41,604 2.36 2.47 <0.01 2.84 2.95 <0.01 
ROA (%) 2,182 41,604 11.08 10.69 <0.01 19.12 18.60 <0.01 
R&D (%) 2,182 41,604 1.26 1.21 <0.01 1.55 1.50 <0.01 
Market Cap 





Panel D: Monthly Transaction Details 
This panel reports the month by month transaction detail for both pre and post SOX period. We report purchase, sales and 
combination of the two types as well. First, we converted all the transaction amounts to 1996 dollar using consumer price index. 
Then we calculated the aggregate monthly transaction amounts for both pre and post SOX samples (for purchase, sales 
subsamples as well as for all transactions). We then normalized this aggregate number by dividing it by the entire amount for  
each regime (pre and post SOX). For example, for the month of January for the pre SOX purchase sample, we first converted all 
the January transactions to 1996 dollar amount, and then we summed them up and divided the amount by total purchase 
transaction amount for the entire pre SOX period. Therefore, we report the monthly transactions as percentage amounts. 
  Purchase   Sales   ALL 
  Pre SOX Post SOX   Pre SOX Post SOX   Pre SOX Post SOX 









































































Table 2-2 Abnormal Returns around the Filing Date, Pre – vs. Post- SOX 
This table reports the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the filing dates. The sample for this study consists of all the insider transactions from January 1, 1996 to December 
31, 2009. The transactions were collected from EDGAR. Pre SOX transactions represent dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002, and post SOX from August 30, 2002 to 
December 31, 2009. We exclude firms with insufficient or no data on CRSP. Returns are market adjusted returns. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels respectively; t-stat for the test for the difference of mean values between the pre and post SOX periods are also reported; a rank test was also done for non-parametric tests, 
and z-stat has been reported for differences in median returns. Panel A reports results for the purchase sample and Panel B reports results for the sales sample. For robustness, we 
have included the pre-electronic filing era data and our results were qualitatively similar. We have also done this study with matching firms (we matched to make sure pre- and 
post SOX sample had same firms) but again the results were qualitatively same. In the final robustness check, we have only included firms that were on S&P 500 and found 
qualitatively similar results. 








Pre SOX (%) Post SOX (%) t-stat for diff. Pre SOX (%) Post SOX (%) z-stat for diff. 
(-40,-10) 743 4,483 1.13* -0.07 -1.53 0.85* 0.00 -1.01 
(-10, -2) 743 4,483 0.54* 0.09 -1.61 0.32* 0.01 -1.81* 
(-5, -2) 743 4,483 0.29* 0.05 -0.98 0.18 0.00 -0.98 
(-1, 0) 743 4,483 0.23* 0.35** 1.89* 0.12* 0.29*** 2.23** 
(0, +1) 743 4,483 0.32* 1.13** 2.06** 0.17** 1.01*** 3.76*** 
(-1, +1) 743 4,483 0.39** 1.24*** 3.49*** 0.23* 1.07*** 2.78*** 
(+2, +5) 743 4,483 0.94 0.93 0.00 0.54 0.51 -0.75 
(+2, +10) 743 4,483 1.16* 1.00 -1.01 0.87* 0.63 1.51 
 
 
                                               
54
 For our comparison event studies between pre- and post SOX samples, we have analyzed subsamples of transactions only by rank1 officers, only by rank2 
officers, only by small cap firms, only by large cap firms, only small trade size, only large trade size, only value firms, only growth firms, and our results 
qualitatively did not change. We did not provide the results for brevity, but will be provided upon request. For the pre SOX sample the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) between the transaction and filing dates is 1.17% with 5% significance. 
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TABLE 2-2 (continued) Abnormal Returns around the Filing Date, Pre vs. Post- SOX 




N MEAN MEDIAN 
Pre SOX Post SOX Pre SOX (%) Post SOX (%) 
t-stat for 
diff. 





(-40,-10) 1,439 37,121 -0.29 0.03 0.67 -0.26 -0.01 0.97 
(-10, -2) 1,439 37,121 -0.14 0.11 1.76* -0.18* 0.03 1.38 
(-5, -2) 1,439 37,121 -0.08 0.06 0.98 -0.13 0.00* 1.51 
(-1, 0) 1,439 37,121 0.01* -0.10 -1.01 -0.07* -0.18 -1.17 
(0, +1) 1,439 37,121 -0.19* -0.54* -1.28 -0.21* -0.57* -1.97** 
(-1, +1) 1,439 37,121 -0.20* -0.58* -1.61* -0.19** -0.59** -2.03** 
(+2, +5) 1,439 37,121 -0.43 -0.44 0.00 -0.47 -0.51 -0.19 
(+2, +10) 1,439 37,121 -0.50 -0.42 0.75 -0.46 -0.47 0.00 
                                               
55
 For our comparison event studies between pre- and post SOX samples, we have analyzed subsamples of transactions only by rank1 officers, only by rank2 
officers, only by small cap firms, only by large cap firms, only small trade size, only large trade size, only value firms, only growth firms, and our results 
qualitatively did not change. We did not provide the results for brevity, but will be provided upon request. For the pre SOX sample the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) between the transaction and filing dates is -0.47% with 10% significance. 
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Table 2-3 Impact of Delay & SOX 
This table reports the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the filing dates for all the transactions made by all the officers in 
the Pre-SOX period. The sample for this study consists of all the insider transactions from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 
2009. The transactions were collected from EDGAR. Pre SOX transactions represent dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 
2002, and post SOX from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We exclude firms with insufficient or no data on CRSP. The 
pre SOX subsample has been split based on different reporting delays; this would help us to identify the impact of ‘variation in 
filing delays’ on the informativeness of the filings. As one of the fundamental changes proposed by SOX is to ensure timelier 
filing, the impact of different filing delays is of great importance to us. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels respectively. Panel A reports the results for the Purchase sample and Panel B reports the results for the Sale sample. 
Panel A: Purchase Sample 
DELAY  N CAR [-1, 0] CAR [0, +1] CAR [-1, +1] 
More than 20 days 384 0.11** 0.09** 0.14** 
Less than 20 days but more than 10 days 251 0.31* 0.47** 0.54* 
Less than 10 days but more than 5 days 79 0.40* 0.67* 0.80* 
Less than 5 days but more than 2 days 14 0.65 0.98 1.17 
Less than or equal to 2 days 15 0.66 1.23 1.44 
Post SOX 4,483 0.35** 1.13** 1.24*** 
Panel B: Sales Sample 
DELAY  N CAR [-1, 0] CAR [0, +1] CAR [-1, +1] 
More than 20 days 830 0.03* -0.14*** -0.14** 
Less than 20 days but more than 10 days 461 -0.01** -0.21** -0.23** 
Less than 10 days but more than 5 days 126 -0.06 -0.37 -0.39 
Less than 5 days but more than 2 days 13 -0.08 -0.45 -0.48 
Less than or equal to 2 days 9 -0.11 -0.68 -0.73 







Table 2-4 Impact of Regulatory and Market Condition Changes 
This table reports the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the filing dates. The sample for this study consists of all the 
insider transactions from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. The transactions were collected from EDGAR. Pre SOX 
transactions represent dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002, and post SOX from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 
2009. We exclude firms with insufficient or no data on CRSP. Regulation FD was passed in October 2000. It has been 
documented that this Act has brought fairness to information dissemination. Then the most comprehensive Act to date, SOX was 
passed in July 2002. We believe that each of this Act has brought an incremental fairness to information dissemination. The great 
credit crunch is the most significant macroeconomic event encompassing our sample period.  We wanted to test for the impact of 
this event on the informativeness of the filings. Therefore, we ran comparisons between pre- and post RegulationFD, pre- and 
post Credit Crunch, and pre RegulationFD and post SOX. The results shown here are outcomes of a comparison between pre- and 
post Regulation Fair Disclosure; and a comparison between pre- and post Credit Crunch of 2008. We also report a comparison 
between pre Reg FD and post SOX period. Pre Reg FD transactions represent dates from January 1, 1996 to September 30, 2000 
and post Reg FD from October 1, 2000 to August 29, 2002. Pre credit crunch transactions represents dates from August 30, 2002 
to December 31, 2007, and post credit crunch from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2009. The sample includes insider 
transactions by all the officers of the companies. Panel A reports returns for insider purchases and Panel B reports returns for 
insider sales. Returns are market adjusted returns calculated by eventus. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels respectively; t-stat for the test for the difference of mean values between the periods are also reported. For robustness 
check, we have also compared post RegulationFD v. post SOX, post RegulationFD v. pre credit crunch and found that the results 
were qualitatively similar, i.e., SOX has clearly provided incremental contribution to RegulationFD. We have also done this 
study with matching firms (we matched to make sure pre- and post SOX sample had same firms) but again the results were 
qualitatively same. In the final robustness check, we have only included firms that were on S&P 500 and found qualitatively 
similar results. Panel A reports the results for the Purchase sample and Panel B reports the results for the Sale sample. All  CARs 
are in %. 
Panel A: Purchase Sample 
Period of Interest N CAR [-1,0] CAR [0,+1] CAR [-1,+1] 
Pre Reg FD 574 0.19* 0.26* 0.32* 
Post Reg FD 169 0.37 0.52* 0.63** 
Post Reg FD - Pre Reg FD 
 
0.18 0.26* 0.31* 
Pre Crunch 2,964 0.26** 0.82** 0.89** 
Post Crunch 1,519 0.53** 1.74** 1.91*** 
Post Crunch - Pre Crunch   0.27** 0.92** 1.02*** 
Post SOX 4,483 0.35** 1.13** 1.24*** 







TABLE 2-4 (continued) Impact of Regulatory and Market Condition Changes 
Panel B: Sales Sample 
Period of Interest N CAR [-1,0] CAR [0,+1] CAR [-1,+1] 
Pre Reg FD 1,126 0.02 -0.12* -0.12* 
Post Reg FD 313 -0.03* -0.42 -0.44 
Post Reg FD - Pre Reg FD 
 
-0.05 -0.30 -0.32 
Pre Crunch 31,152 -0.08 -0.46* -0.49* 
Post Crunch 5,969 -0.18* -0.97** -1.04** 
Post Crunch - Pre Crunch   -0.10 -0.51** -0.55** 
Post SOX 37,121 -0.10 -0.54* -0.58* 




Table 2-5 Cross-sectional Analysis: Regulatory & Market Condition Changes 
Panel A: Purchase Sample 
This panel reports regression results for purchase sample in which two day abnormal return (CAR0,1) around insider filing is the 
dependent variable. The sample for this study consists of all the insider transactions from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. 
The transactions were collected from EDGAR. Pre SOX transactions represent dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002, 
and post SOX from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We exclude firms with insufficient or no data on CRSP. The sample 
here includes purchase transactions filed by all the officers from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. Pre Reg FD transactions 
represent dates from January 1, 1996 to September 30, 2000 and post Reg FD from October 1, 2000 to August 29, 2002. Pre 
credit crunch transactions represents dates from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2007, and post credit crunch from January 1, 
2008 to December 31, 2009. The sample includes insider transactions by all the officers of the companies. For this cross sectional 
analysis we control for InsiderRank (a dummy variable which equals to one if the officer is Chairman, Vice Chairman, CEO, 
COO, CFO, or President), TradeSize (average transaction amount scaled by market cap on the day of the filing), MktCap (log of 
the market cap on the day of the filing), Delay (the time lag between the transaction and filing dates), and R&D (R&D 
expenditure scaled by sales). Returns are market adjusted. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 
respectively; t-stat are reported within parenthesis. For robustness, we have included the pre-electronic filing era data and our 
results were qualitatively similar. We have also done this study with matching firms (we matched to make sure pre- and post 
SOX sample had same firms) but again the results were qualitatively same. In the final robustness check, we have only included 
firms that were on S&P 500 and found qualitatively similar results. 
 
Variables 
PRE SOX  
(1996 - 2002) 
  
POST SOX  
(2002 - 2009) 































































































N 574 169 743   2,964 1,519 4,483 






TABLE 2-5 (continued) Cross-sectional Analysis: Regulatory & Market Condition Changes 
Panel B: Sales Sample 
This panel reports regression results for sale sample in which two day abnormal return (CAR0,1) around insider filing is the 
dependent variable. The sample for this study consists of all the insider transactions from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. 
The transactions were collected from EDGAR. Pre SOX transactions represent dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002, 
and post SOX from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We exclude firms with insufficient or no data on CRSP. The sample 
here includes purchase transactions filed by all the officers from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. Pre Reg FD transactions 
represent dates from January 1, 1996 to September 30, 2000 and post Reg FD from October 1, 2000 to August 29, 2002. Pre 
credit crunch transactions represents dates from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2007, and post credit crunch from January 1, 
2008 to December 31, 2009. The sample includes all insider transactions by all the officers of the companies. For this cross 
sectional analysis we control for InsiderRank (a dummy variable which equals to one if the officer is Chairman, Vice Chairman, 
CEO, COO, CFO, or President), TradeSize (average transaction amount scaled by market cap on the day of the filing), MktCap 
(log of the market cap on the day of the filing), Delay (the time lag between the transaction and filing dates), and R&D (R&D 
expenditure scaled by sales). Returns are market adjusted. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 
respectively; t-stat are reported within parenthesis. For robustness, we have included the pre-electronic filing era data and our 
results were qualitatively similar. We have also done this study with matching firms (we matched to make sure pre- and post 
SOX sample had same firms) but again the results were qualitatively same. In the final robustness check, we have only included 
firms that were on S&P 500 and found qualitatively similar results. 
 
Variables 
PRE SOX  
(1996 - 2002) 
  
POST SOX  
(2002 - 2009) 






























































































N 1,126 313 1,439   31,152 5,969 37,121 





Table 2-6 Information Asymmetry Test: Regression results 
Panel A: Purchase Sample
56
 
This panel reports regression results for purchase sample in which two day abnormal return (CAR0,1) around insider filing is controlled for firm characteristics for the subsamples 
partitioned by the degree of information asymmetry. The sample for this study consists of all the insider transactions from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. The transactions 
were collected from EDGAR. Pre SOX transactions represent dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002, and post SOX from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We 
exclude firms with insufficient or no data on CRSP. The sample here includes purchase transactions filed by all the officers from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. The 
measures for information asymmetry are: Market-to-Book, Intangible Asset (scaled by total assets), and R&D expense (scaled by sales). In each of the regressions, we define firms 
with top half of each of the information asymmetry measures as high and the bottom half as low. Firms with High Market-to-Book, High Intangible Assets, and High R&D 
expenditures are the ones with high information asymmetry. The firm characteristics controls are Market-to-Book (market value of equity to book value of equity), MktCap (log of 
market cap on the day of the filing), InsiderRank (a dummy which equals to one if the officer is Chairman, Vice Chairman, CEO, COO, CFO or President and zero otherwise), and 
Dividend Yield (cash dividend to price ratio). The numbers in the parenthesis are the t-stat; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For 
robustness, we have included the pre-electronic filing era data and our results were qualitatively similar. We have also done this study with matching firms (we matched to make 
sure pre- and post SOX sample had same firms) but again the results were qualitatively same. In the final robustness check, we have only included firms that were on S&P 500 and 




Market-to-Book Intangible Assets R&D 
Pre Sox 
[N = 743] 
Post Sox 
[N = 4,483] 
Pre Sox 
[N = 743] 
Post Sox 
[N = 4,483] 
Pre Sox 
[N = 743] 
Post Sox 
[N = 4,483] 
Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi 




























































































R-square 0.062 0.093 0.084 0.112 0.053 0.065 0.082 0.097 0.076 0.097 0.113 0.173 
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 As Post SOX filings were more frequent than the pre SOX period, as robustness check we only picked filings for each company with a minimum gap of 90 
days. This filter resulted in 2,360 purchase and 3,641 sales transactions. We then ran the information asymmetry regressions for purchase and sales samples and 
the results were qualitatively similar to the ones reported above. 
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TABLE 2-6 (continued) Information Asymmetry Test: Regression results 
Panel B: Sales Sample
57
 
This panel reports regression results for sales sample in which two day abnormal return (CAR0,1) around insider filing is controlled for firm characteristics for the subsamples 
partitioned by the degree of information asymmetry. The sample for this study consists of all the insider transactions from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. The transactions 
were collected from EDGAR. Pre SOX transactions represent dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002, and post SOX from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We 
exclude firms with insufficient or no data on CRSP. The sample here includes sales transactions filed by all the officers from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2009. The measures 
for information asymmetry are: Market-to-Book, Intangible Asset (scaled by total assets), and R&D expense (scaled by sales). In each of the regressions, we define firms with top 
half of each of the information asymmetry measures as high and the bottom half as low. Firms with High Market-to-Book, High Intangible Assets, and High R&D expenditures are 
the ones with high information asymmetry. The firm characteristics controls are Market-to-Book (market value of equity to book value of equity), MktCap (log of market cap on 
the day of the filing), InsiderRank (a dummy which equals to one if the officer is Chairman, Vice Chairman, CEO, COO, CFO or President and zero otherwise), and Dividend 
Yield (cash dividend to price ratio). The numbers in the parenthesis are the t-stat; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness, 
we have included the pre-electronic filing era data and our results were qualitatively similar. We have also done this study with matching firms (we matched to make sure pre- and 
post SOX sample had same firms) but again the results were qualitatively same. In the final robustness check, we have only included firms that were on S&P 500 and found 




Market-to-Book Intangible Assets R&D 
Pre Sox 
[N = 1,439] 
Post Sox 
[N = 37,121] 
Pre Sox 
[N = 1,439] 
Post Sox 
[N = 37,121] 
Pre Sox 
[N = 1,439] 
Post Sox 
[N = 37,121] 
Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi 




























































































R-square 0.043 0.056 0.09 0.086 0.065 0.056 0.091 0.133 0.061 0.089 0.132 0.169 
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 As Post SOX filings were more frequent than the pre SOX period, as robustness check we only picked filings for each company with a minimum gap of 90 
days. This filter resulted in 2,360 purchase and 3,641 sales transactions. We then ran the information asymmetry regressions for purchase and sales samples and 
the results were qualitatively similar to the ones reported above. 
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Table 3-1 Sample Description by Year and Diversification 
The sample consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions 
from Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers 
subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and 
has stock return and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. If 
the acquirer and target have same 4-digit SIC58 then they are considered within the same industry or else they are considered to 














Deal Size > 30% 
1996 65 46 19 33.88% 22 
1997 105 85 20 103.89% 42 
1998 100 74 26 42.13% 29 
1999 148 112 36 26.28% 33 
2000 139 107 32 90.34% 19 
2001 64 37 27 22.35% 14 
2002 42 30 12 34.09% 4 
2003 28 16 12 21.68% 5 
2004 18 14 4 18.27% 7 
2005 30 21 9 9.09% 3 
2006 22 18 4 16.30% 7 
2007 62 47 15 10.83% 4 
2008 47 30 17 16.36% 10 
2009 40 27 13 9.89% 3 
Total 910 664 246 43.99% 202 
 
                                               
58
 Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) report that if targets and acquirer share same 4-digit SIC then they are in the 
same industry or else they are in different industry. 
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Table 3-2 Summary Statistics 
This table provides some summary statistics about the acquiring and target firms, and the deals. The sample consists of 910 
completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data 
Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value 
disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and has stock return and 
financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre SOX 
announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are from 
August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. The definitions of the variables have been provided in Appendix I.***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
  
PRE SOX 
(N = 656) 
POST SOX  
(N = 254) 
POST - PRE 
VARIABLES MEAN MEDIAN MEAN MEDIAN MEAN MEDIAN 
ACQUIRER CHARACTERISTICS 
Firm Size (Log of book value of assets) 3.51 3.48 3.70 3.59 0.19** 0.11** 
Tobin's q 2.72 2.07 2.60 2.05 -0.12** -0.02** 
Leverage 0.70 0.66 0.55 0.53 -0.15*** -0.13** 
Operating Performance (EBITDA/TA) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.00 -0.01 
Sales ($ millions) 10292.94 3197.24 13965.74 3921.10 3672.80** 723.86** 
TARGET CHARACTERISTICS 
Firm Size (Log of book value of assets) 2.37 2.30 2.53 2.45 0.16*** 0.15** 
Tobin's q 1.86 1.57 2.29 1.86 0.43*** 0.29*** 
Leverage 0.51 0.46 0.47 0.38 -0.04** -0.08** 
Operating Performance (EBITDA/TA) 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.08 -0.02* -0.01* 
Sales ($ millions) 205.48 121.54 199.90 102.42 -5.58* -19.12* 
DEAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Transaction Value ($ millions) 233.30 147.54 227.24 120.64 -6.06 -26.90* 
Relative Deal Size 0.54 0.11 0.15 0.09 -0.39*** -0.02* 
Delay (in days) 77.32 57.00 79.34 51.00 2.02 -6.00 
Hostile (dummy) 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Cash (dummy) 0.60 1.00 0.52 1.00 -0.073* 0.00* 
Diversification (dummy) 0.74 1.00 0.70 1.00 -0.04*** 0.00*** 
Premium (%) 36.24 28.78 45.26 31.24 9.02*** 2.46*** 
Synergy (dummy) 0.44 0.00 0.54 1.00 0.10** 1.00** 
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Figure 3-1 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) for Targets around the Announcement 
Date 
This figure represents the CARs around acquisition announcements for target firms. The sample consists of 910 completed U.S. 
tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data Corporation 
(SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is 
greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and has stock return and financial data available 
from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre SOX announcements cover announcement 
dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. 
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Figure 3-2 Net Purchase in Target Firms around the Announcement Date 
This figure represents the net purchase in target firms scaled by market value around acquisition announcement date. The sample 
consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson 
Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the 
deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and has stock return 
and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. The insider trading 
data was collected from EDGAR for the aforementioned time period. Pre SOX announcements cover announcement dates from 
January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. The solid 
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Table 3-3 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) for Targets around the Announcement 
Date 
This table reports the abnormal returns around acquisition announcement dates for both pre and post SOX periods. The sample 
consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson 
Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the 
deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and has stock return 
and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre SOX 
announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are from 
August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We report different windows around the acquisition announcement date, starting from 
t=-60 to t=+30 days, where t=0 is the announcement date. Returns are market adjusted. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness check, we compared post RegulationFD v. post SOX, but qualitatively 
results were similar. We have also controlled for macro events by excluding IT bubble and post credit crunch years, and our 











Post - Pre t-stat 




Post - Pre z-stat 
[-60, -30] 
 
1.84%** -1.59% -3.43%** -2.24 
 
1.77%** -1.58% -3.35%*** -2.53 
[-30, -10] 
 
5.95%*** 3.31% -2.64%* -1.87 
 
5.54%*** 3.66%*** -1.88%** -1.98 
[-10, -5] 
 
3.40%*** 2.70%*** -0.70%** -2.21 
 
3.21%*** 3.76%*** 0.55% 0.85 
[-5, 0] 
 
29.32%*** 29.79%*** 0.47% 1.44 
 
32.29%*** 32.33%*** 0.04% 1.01 
[-1, 0] 
 
24.73%*** 28.38%*** 3.65%* 1.65 
 
27.90%*** 30.93%*** 3.03%* 1.84 
[0, 0] 
 
22.11%*** 27.27%*** 5.16%* 1.74 
 
25.21%*** 29.86%*** 4.65%** 2.17 
[-1,+1] 
 
30.18%*** 39.42%*** 9.24%*** 2.50 
 
33.64%*** 42.36%*** 8.72%*** 2.74 
[0, +1] 
 
27.56%*** 38.31%*** 10.75%*** 3.17 
 
30.95%*** 41.29%*** 10.34%*** 4.13 
[0, +5] 
 
27.86%*** 38.55%*** 10.69%*** 2.86 
 
31.25%*** 41.59%*** 10.34%*** 3.89 
[+5, +30] 
 
1.90%*** 1.42%* -0.48% -1.28 
 














Table 3-4 Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Targets on Explanatory 
Variables 
This table reports the results from regressing the cumulative abnormal returns for targets on different explanatory variables. The 
sample consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from 
Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: 
(1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and has stock 
return and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre SOX 
announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are from 
August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. The dependent variable we use here is Cumulative Abnormal Return from t=-1 to t=+1, 
CAR-1,+1. First model uses a ‘SOX’ dummy (equals to one if the announcement date was after August 29, 2002, and zero 
otherwise); Second model uses SOX dummy along with target characteristics controls like operating income growth rate (average 
growth between t=-3 to t=-1 year), firm size (log of total assets), leverage (long term debt scaled by total assets), operating 
performance (EBITDA scaled by total assets), and tobin’s q; Third model uses ‘SOX’ dummy along with deal characteristics 
control variables like premium (Percent premium paid to target based on the price on the day before the announcement), relative 
deal size (transaction value scaled by acquirer’s market value), ‘Hostile’ dummy (equals to one if the deal was flagged as hostile 
in SDC Platinum), payment method dummy ‘Cash’ (equals to one if the deal was an all cash transaction), and diversification 
dummy (equals to one if target and acquirer’s 4-digit SIC match). Returns are market adjusted. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness check, we only include post RegulationFD years for 
pre SOX, but qualitatively results were similar. We have also controlled for macro events by excluding IT bubble and post credit 
crunch years, and our results still hold qualitatively. 
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Sample Size 843 659 843 659 
Adjusted R
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Figure 3-3 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) for Acquirers around the Announcement 
Date 
This figure represents the CARs around acquisition announcements for acquiring firms. The sample consists of 910 completed 
U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data 
Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value 
disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and has stock return and 
financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre SOX 
announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are from 
August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. The solid line represents pre-SOX sample period returns and the dotted line represents 













-60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 
PRE 
POST 




Table 3-5 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) for Acquirers around the Announcement 
Date 
This table reports the abnormal returns around acquisition announcement dates for both pre and post SOX periods. The sample 
consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson 
Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the 
deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and has stock return 
and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre SOX 
announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are from 
August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We report different windows around the acquisition announcement date, starting from 
t=-60 to t=+30 days, where t=0 is the announcement date. Returns are market adjusted. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness check, we compared post RegulationFD v. post SOX, but qualitatively 
results were similar. We have also controlled for macro events by excluding IT bubble and post credit crunch years, and our 




MEAN   MEDIAN 









Post - Pre z-stat 
[-60, -30] 
 
-0.54% -0.65% -0.11% -0.21 
 
-0.28% -0.60% -0.32% -0.82 
[-30, -10] 
 
-0.82% -0.11% 0.71% 0.78 
 
-0.79% -0.40% 0.39% 0.91 
[-10, -5] 
 
0.21% 0.39% 0.18% 1.19 
 
0.43% 0.39% -0.04% -0.17 
[-5, 0] 
 
-1.08%* 0.21%* 1.29%* 1.71 
 
-0.91%** 0.05%* 0.96%** 2.13 
[-1, 0] 
 
-0.67%** -0.27%** 0.40%* 1.66 
 
-0.49%* -0.22%** 0.27%* 1.83 
[0, 0] 
 
-0.51%** -0.19%*** 0.32%* 1.78 
 
-0.42%*** -0.10%** 0.32%** 1.99 
[-1,+1] 
 
-1.06%** 0.29%** 1.35%** 1.98 
 
-0.94%*** 0.47%** 1.41%*** 2.57 
[0, +1] 
 
-0.90%** 0.36%*** 1.26%** 2.18 
 
-0.86%*** 0.60%** 1.46%*** 2.73 
[0, +5] 
 
-1.35%** 0.60%* 1.95%* 1.87 
 
-1.62%** 0.86%** 2.48%** 2.01 
[+5, +30] 
 
-0.60% 0.31% 0.91% 1.46 
 
-0.81% -0.18% 0.63% 0.98 
OBSERVATIONS 
 
543 247       543 247     
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Table 3-6 Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Acquirers on Explanatory 
Variables 
This table reports the results from regressing the cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers on different explanatory variables. 
The sample consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions 
from Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers 
subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and 
has stock return and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre 
SOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are 
from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. The dependent variable we use here is Cumulative Abnormal Return from t=-1 to 
t=+1, CAR-1,+1. First model uses a ‘SOX’ dummy (equals to one if the announcement date was after August 29, 2002, and zero 
otherwise); Second model uses SOX dummy along with acquirer characteristics controls like operating income growth rate 
(average growth between t=-3 to t=-1 year), firm size (log of total assets), leverage (long term debt scaled by total assets), 
operating performance (EBITDA scaled by total assets), and tobin’s q; Third model uses ‘SOX’ dummy along with deal 
characteristics control variables like relative deal size (transaction value scaled by acquirer’s market value), ‘Hostile’ dummy 
(equals to one if the deal was flagged as hostile in SDC Platinum), payment method dummy ‘Cash’  (equals to one if the deal was 
an all cash transaction), and diversification dummy (equals to one if target and acquirer’s 4-digit SIC match). Returns are market 
adjusted. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness check, we only 
include post RegulationFD years for pre SOX, but qualitatively results were similar. We have also controlled for macro events  by 
excluding IT bubble and post credit crunch years, and our results still hold qualitatively. 


































































Sample Size 790 637 790 637 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.029 0.007 0.030 
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Table 3-7 Relationship between Target Gain and Total and Acquirer Gains 
This table reports regression results where target gain is the dependent variable. In Model I Total Gain is the independent variable and in Model II Acquirer Gain is the independent 
variable. The sample consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data Corporation 
(SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and 
acquirer are both publicly traded and has stock return and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre SOX 
announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. We classify 
acquisitions either as synergy driven or agency driven using the approach in Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). They use the correlation between target gain and total gain and the 
correlation between target gain and acquirer gain are used as predictors of agency driven or synergy driven acquisition. A positive correlation factor implies the presence of 
synergy and vice versa. According to them, if the total, target, and acquirer gains are all positive then it is classified as a value-maximizing (synergy) merger; else it is an agency-
driven merger. Following them, we calculate the cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date for both target and acquirer firms. Market model estimates for each 
firm were calculated using a maximum of 255 trading days of daily returns data beginning 127 days before the announcement of the first tender bid. Target gain is calculated by 
multiplying the CAR by the market value of target’s equity as of the end of six trading days prior to first announcement for the target minus the value of target  shares held by the 
acquirer before the announcement. Likewise, the acquirer gain is calculated by multiplying the CAR by the market value of acquiring firm as of the end of six trading days prior to 
the first announcement made by the acquiring firm. The total gain is the sum of the target and acquirer gains. Coefficients are estimated for the entire sample for each regime (pre- 
and post SOX) as well as subsamples of positive and negative total gains. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness check, 
we only include post RegulationFD years for pre SOX, but qualitatively results were similar. We have also controlled for macro events by excluding IT bubble and post credit 





FULL SAMPLE   POSITIVE TOTAL GAIN SUB-SAMPLE   NEGATIVE TOTAL GAIN SUB-SAMPLE 













































































(-1.94)   
ACQUIRER 













R-SQUARE 0.002 0.030 0.004 0.002   0.012 0.031 0.001 0.001   0.046 0.016 0.074 0.068 
Sample Size 593 250 593 250   344 171 344 171   249 79 249 79 
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Table 3-8 Post-Acquisition Operating Performance (ROA) 
This table reports the industry and matched firm adjusted post-acquisition operating performance (ROA) results for the acquirers. 
The sample consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions 
from Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers 
subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and 
has stock return and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre 
SOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are 
from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. Operating performance here is measured as the return on assets (ROA). Barber and 
Lyon (1996) also use ROA and ROS as operating performance measures. ROA is the ratio of operating income scaled by total 
assets where operating income is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). We 
analyzed the ratios for 6-year period starting from the year of the announcement to five years after the acquisition.***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness check, we only include post RegulationFD 
years for pre SOX, but qualitatively results were similar. We have also controlled for macro events by excluding IT bubble and 
post credit crunch years, and our results still hold qualitatively. The results for same and different industry subsamples were 
qualitatively similar to that of the full sample reported above. Therefore, we did not report it here for brevity. All ratios reported 
in this table are industry and matched firm adjusted. We matched each of the acquiring firm with a non-event firm based on 
Industry (2-digit SIC), Book-to-Market, and Size. 
Panel A: Year-by-year Industry and Matched-Firm adjusted ROA 
  Industry adjusted   Matched firm adjusted 
Year 
Pre Sox 
(1996 - 2002) 
Post Sox 
(2002-2009) 
Post - Pre 
 
Pre Sox 
(1996 - 2002) 
Post Sox 
(2002-2009) 
Post - Pre 
0 -0.46% -1.28%* -0.82%   0.33% 0.47%* 0.14% 
+1 -1.42%*** -0.74%* 0.69%* 
 
0.72% 1.64%* 0.92% 
+2 -1.56%*** -1.19%* 0.37%* 
 
-0.31%* 1.03%** 1.34%* 
+3 -2.33%*** -1.36%* 0.96%* 
 
-1.27%* 0.35%* 1.62%* 
+4 -1.86%*** 0.54%* 2.40%* 
 
-1.17%* 0.98%* 2.15%* 
+5 -2.47%*** 0.48%* 2.95%**   -0.30%* 2.38%** 2.68%** 
 
Panel B: Summary – Industry and Matched-Firm adjusted ROA 
  Industry adjusted   Matched firm adjusted 
 
Pre Sox 
(1996 - 2002) 
Post Sox 
(2002-2009) 
Post - Pre 
 
Pre Sox 
(1996 - 2002) 
Post Sox 
(2002-2009) 
Post - Pre 
Average 3-
year 
-1.77%*** -1.05%** 0.72%**   -0.29% 1.01%** 1.30%* 
Average 5-
year 




Table 3-9 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Operating Performance – ROA 
This table reports regressions of average three and five year industry and matched firm adjusted return on assets (ROA) on 
various independent variables. The sample consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the 
initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all 
completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acqui rer are 
both publicly traded and has stock return and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Compustat respectively. Pre SOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post 
SOX sample the dates are from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. Adapting and expanding from Heron and Lie (2002) we 
use independent variables like SOX dummy (equals to one if the announcement date was after August 29, 2002, and zero 
otherwise), ratio of targets assets to target and acquirer combined assets (assets are book value of assets and at time t=-1), market-
to-book for acquirer (at t=-1), market-to-book for target (at t=-1), same industry dummy (equals to one if 4-digit SIC matches, 
MSV 1990), and a delay variable (the time lag between the first announcement of a bid and the final acquisition of the 
target). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness check, we only include 
post RegulationFD years for pre SOX, but qualitatively results were similar. We have also controlled for macro events by 
excluding IT bubble and post credit crunch years, and our results still hold qualitatively. 
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Sample Size 753 657   753 657 










Table 3-10 Post-Acquisition Operating Performance (ROS) 
This table reports the industry and matched firm adjusted post-acquisition operating performance (ROS) results for the acquirers. 
The sample consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions 
from Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers 
subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and 
has stock return and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre 
SOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are 
from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. Operating performance is measured as the return on sales (ROS). Barber and Lyon 
(1996) use ROA and ROS as operating performance measures. ROS is measured as the ratio of operating income (EBITDA) 
scaled by sales revenue.  We analyzed the ratios for 6-year period starting from the year of the announcement to five years after 
the acquisition.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness check, we only 
include post RegulationFD years for pre SOX, but qualitatively results were similar. We have also controlled for macro events by 
excluding IT bubble and post credit crunch years, and our results still hold qualitatively. The results for same and different 
industry subsamples were qualitatively similar to that of the full sample reported above. Therefore, we did not report it here for 
brevity. All ratios reported in this table are industry and matched firm adjusted. We matched each of the acquiring firm with a 
non-event firm based on Industry (2-digit SIC), Book-to-Market, and Size.  
Panel A: Year-by-year Industry and Matched-Firm adjusted ROS 
  Industry adjusted   Matched firm adjusted 
Year 
Pre Sox 
(1996 - 2002) 
Post Sox 
(2002-2009) 
Post - Pre 
 
Pre Sox 
(1996 - 2002) 
Post Sox 
(2002-2009) 
Post - Pre 
0 
-1.13% -2.15%* -1.02% 
  
-0.20% 0.57%** 0.77%* 
+1 
-3.69%*** -1.62%* 2.07%*  -0.40% 0.36%* 0.77% 
+2 
-4.16%*** -1.98%* 2.18%*  -0.71%* 0.97%* 1.68%* 
+3 
-4.89%*** -3.25%** 1.64%*  -2.02%** 3.04%** 5.06%** 
+4 
-3.32%*** -1.94%* 1.37%*  -2.21%*** 4.58%** 6.79%** 
+5 
-3.63%*** 0.72%* 4.36%* 
  
-0.66%* 7.25%** 7.91%* 
Panel B: Summary – Industry and Matched-Firm adjusted ROS 
  Industry adjusted   Matched firm adjusted 
 
Pre Sox 
(1996 - 2002) 
Post Sox 
(2002-2009) 
Post - Pre 
 
Pre Sox 
(1996 - 2002) 
Post Sox 
(2002-2009) 
Post - Pre 
Average 3-
year -4.25%*** -2.17%** 2.08%* 
  
-1.04%** 1.26%** 2.29%** 
Average 5-
year -3.94%*** -1.86%*** 2.07%** 
  






Table 3-11 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Operating Performance – ROS 
This table reports regressions of average three and five year industry and matched firm adjusted return on sales (ROS) on various 
independent variables. The sample consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial 
sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all 
completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the target and acqui rer are 
both publicly traded and has stock return and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Compustat respectively. Pre SOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post 
SOX sample the dates are from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009. Adapting and expanding from Heron and Lie (2002) we 
use independent variables like SOX dummy (equals to one if the announcement date was after August 29, 2002, and zero 
otherwise), ratio of targets assets to target and acquirer combined assets (assets are book value of assets and at time t=-1), market-
to-book for acquirer (at t=-1), market-to-book for target (at t=-1), same industry dummy (equals to one if 4-digit SIC matches, 
MSV 1990), and a delay variable (the time lag between the first announcement of a bid and the final acquisition of the 
target). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. For robustness check, we only include 
post RegulationFD years for pre SOX, but qualitatively results were similar. We have also controlled for macro events by 
excluding IT bubble and post credit crunch years, and our results still hold qualitatively. 
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Sample Size 741 639   741 639 








Table 3-12 Performance Tests—BHAR Approach 
This table reports the Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for the acquiring firms. As per Mitchell and Stafford (2000), BHAR would represent the abnormal returns from 
holding a long position in the event firms and a short position on the matching firms, vis-à-vis the difference between long positions in event and matched firms where event firms 
could be matched based on some firm characteristics. We match each of the acquiring firm with a non-event firm based on Industry (2-digit SIC), Book-to-Market, and Size. An 
alternate approach is the Jensen’s alpha approach, also known as calendar time portfolio approach. Since this approach weights observations equally across time rather than fi rms, 
Kothari and Warner (2004) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue against using the Jensen’s alpha approach as it is more biased towards finding results consistent with market 
efficiency. The sample consists of 910 completed U.S. tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data 
Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $50 million; (2) the 
target and acquirer are both publicly traded and has stock return and financial data available from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat respectively. Pre 
SOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to August 29, 2002; for post SOX sample the dates are from August 30, 2002 to December 31, 2009.We 
report the performances for three and five year time periods after the acquisition. The full sample for each period was divided into quartiles based on related deal size (transaction 
value scaled by acquirer’s market value)—the 1st quartile being the smallest of related deal sizes and the fourth being the largest ones. Same industry subsample signifies a 4-digit 
SIC match between the target and the acquirer. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) report that if targets and acquirer share same 4-digit SIC then they are in the same industry or 
else they are in different industry. Panel A and panel B report results from pre- and post SOX periods respectively. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels respectively. For robustness check, we only include post RegulationFD years for pre SOX, but qualitatively results were similar for the full sample. We have also controlled 
for macro events by excluding IT bubble and post credit crunch years, and our results still hold qualitatively for the full sample. 
Panel A: Pre SOX Sample 
PERIOD FULL Sample 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile Same Industry Different Industry 
3-year -18.12%** -20.62%*** -14.28%** -10.01%** -27.16%* -13.91%** -20.13%** 






Panel B: Post SOX Sample 
PERIOD FULL Sample 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile Same Industry Different Industry 
3-year 9.25%*** 2.72%*** 5.76%** 16.60%** 9.67%*** 11.22%*** 8.43%*** 
5-year 2.29%** 8.01%*** -7.50%** 12.14%* -4.66%* 4.21%** 1.44%*** 
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Table 4-1 Sample Description by Year and Diversification 
The sample consists of 238 completed Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of 
acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender 
offers subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly 
traded and Canadian and has stock return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research 
Center (CFMRC) and Compustat respectively. If the acquirer and target have same 4-digit SIC59 then they are considered within 
the same industry or else they are considered to be in different industry. Relative deal size is measured as Transaction Value 










1996 15 4 11 8.82% 
1997 24 11 13 15.64% 
1998 20 10 10 15.19% 
1999 24 11 13 36.55% 
2000 41 26 15 15.55% 
2001 24 11 13 35.10% 
2002 11 7 4 18.52% 
2003 3 2 1 2.22% 
2004 9 4 5 36.98% 
2005 8 5 3 29.31% 
2006 12 3 9 18.04% 
2007 21 13 8 19.67% 
2008 15 8 7 12.49% 
2009 11 5 6 23.44% 








                                               
59
 Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) report that if targets and acquirer share same 4-digit SIC then they are in the 
same industry or else they are in different industry. 
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Table 4-2 Summary Statistics 
This table provides some summary statistics about the acquiring and target firms, and the deals. The sample consists of 238 
completed Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial 
Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value 
disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and Canadian and has stock 
return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) and Compustat respectively. Pre 
CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to April 6, 2003; and for post CSOX sample the dates are 
from April 7, 2003 onwards. The definitions of the variables have been provided in Appendix I. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
  
PRE C-SOX 
(1996 - 2003) 
[N = 159] 
  
POST C-SOX 
(2003 - 2009) 
[N = 79] 
  POST - PRE 
VARIABLES MEAN MEDIAN   MEAN MEDIAN   MEAN MEDIAN 
ACQUIRER CHARACTERISTICS 




































Sales ($ millions) 286.07 73.11   860.50 118.17   574.43* 45.06** 
DEAL CHARACTERISTICS 





































Figure 4-1 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) for Targets around the Announcement 
Date 
This figure represents the CARs around acquisition announcements for target firms. The sample consists of 238 completed 
Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data 
Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value 
disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and Canadian and has stock 
return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) and Compustat respectively. Pre 
CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to April 6, 2003; and for post CSOX sample the dates are 
from April 7, 2003 onwards. The solid line represents pre-CSOX sample period returns and the dotted line represents the post 




















Table 4-3 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) for Targets around the Announcement 
Date 
This table reports the abnormal returns around acquisition announcement dates for both pre and post CSOX periods. The sample 
consists of 238 completed Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from 
Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: 
(1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and Canadian 
and has stock return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) and Compustat 
respectively. Pre CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to April 6, 2003; and for post CSOX 
sample the dates are from April 7, 2003 onwards. We report different windows around the acquisition announcement date, 
starting from t=-60 to t=+30 days, where t=0 is the announcement date. This is a comparison study between pre- and post CSOX 
periods to test the differences in activities around merger between these two regimes. Returns are market adjusted. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
Event Window 
MEAN   MEDIAN 
Pre CSOX 
(1996 - 2003) 
Post CSOX 
(2003 - 2009) 










Post - Pre 
z-
stat 
[-60, -30] 6.10% 8.10% 2.00% 0.68 
 
2.87% 6.84% 3.97% 0.55 
[-30, -10] 21.80%*** 5.96% -15.84% -0.27 
 
22.21%** 3.85% -18.36% -0.67 
[-10, -5] -0.51% 6.61%** 7.12% 1.58 
 
-2.98%* 5.74% 8.72% 0.88 
[-5, 0] 10.70%*** 21.67%*** 10.97%*** 2.45 
 
11.70%** 20.36%** 8.66%** 1.99 
[-1, 0] 10.53%*** 15.79%*** 5.26%*** 3.01 
 
12.52%** 14.68%*** 2.16%** 2.01 
[0, 0] 8.76%*** 16.56%*** 7.80%*** 2.87 
 
11.43%** 15.63%*** 4.20%*** 4.27 
[-1,+1] 12.03%*** 17.01%*** 4.98%*** 3.28 
 
14.41%** 16.13%*** 1.72%*** 3.89 
[0, +1] 9.91%*** 17.78%*** 7.87%** 1.98 
 
11.55%*** 17.08%*** 5.53%*** 2.97 
[0, +5] 8.62%*** 16.4%*** 7.78%** 2.11 
 
10.34%* 15.22%** 4.88%* 1.65 
[+5, +30] -3.45% 4.01% 7.46% 1.14 
 
-5.15% 3.34% 8.49% 1.11 























Table 4-4 Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Targets on Explanatory 
Variables 
This table reports the results from regressing the cumulative abnormal returns for targets on different explanatory variables. The 
sample consists of 238 completed Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions 
from Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers 
subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and 
Canadian and has stock return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) and 
Compustat respectively. Pre CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to April 6, 2003; and for 
post CSOX sample the dates are from April 7, 2003 onwards. The dependent variable we use here is Cumulative Abnormal 
Return from t=-1 to t=+1, CAR-1,+1. First model uses a ‘CSOX’ dummy (equals to one if the announcement date was after April 
6, 2003, and zero otherwise); Second model uses CSOX dummy along with target characteristics controls like firm size (log of 
total assets), leverage (long term debt scaled by total assets), and free cash flow (EBITDA scaled by total assets); Third model 
uses ‘CSOX’ dummy along with deal characteristics control variables like relative deal size (transaction value scaled by 
acquirer’s market value), premium (as reported on SDC platinum), ‘Hostile’ dummy (equals to one if the deal was flagged as 
hostile in SDC Platinum), and payment method dummy ‘Cash’ (equals to one if the deal was an all cash transaction). Returns are 
market adjusted. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
 
VARIABLES MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV 
CSOX (dummy) 0.019* 0.014* 0.008* 0.009* 
















Deal Characteristics         




























Figure 4-2 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) for Acquirers around the Announcement 
Date 
This figure represents the CARs around acquisition announcements for acquiring firms. The sample consists of 238 completed 
Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data 
Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value 
disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and Canadian and has stock 
return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) and Compustat respectively. Pre 
CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to April 6, 2003; and for post CSOX sample the dates are 
from April 7, 2003 onwards. The solid line represents pre-CSOX sample period returns and the dotted line represents the post 








































Table 4-5 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CARs) for Acquirers around the Announcement 
Date 
This table reports the abnormal returns around acquisition announcement dates for both pre and post CSOX periods. The sample 
consists of 238 completed Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from 
Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: 
(1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and Canadian 
and has stock return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) and Compustat 
respectively. Pre CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to April 6, 2003; and for post CSOX 
sample the dates are from April 7, 2003 onwards. We report different windows around the acquisition announcement date, 
starting from t=-60 to t=+30 days, where t=0 is the announcement date. This is a comparison study between pre- and post CSOX 
periods to test the differences in activities around merger between these two regimes. Returns are market adjusted. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
Event Window 

















Post - Pre 
z-
stat 
[-60, -30] 2.47%* 3.17%* 0.70%* 1.66  1.78%** 3.11%* 1.33%* 
1.71 
[-30, -10] 2.44%** 3.34% 0.90%* 1.81  2.36%** 4.63%* 2.27%* 
1.65 
[-10, -5] 0.03%*** 0.99%** 0.96%** 1.98  0.44%** 0.93%** 0.49%* 
1.68 
[-5, 0] 0.00%*** 0.22%** 0.22%** 2.17  -0.38%*** 0.42%*** 0.80%*** 
3.14 
[-1, 0] -0.62%** -0.20%* 0.42%** 2.11  -0.57%*** -0.08%** 0.49%** 
1.98 
[0, 0] -0.43%*** -0.05%** 0.38%*** 2.87  -0.21%** 0.00%** 0.21%* 
1.87 
[-1,+1] -0.78%** -0.57%** 0.21%** 2.01  -0.51%*** -0.20%** 0.31%** 
2.09 
[0, +1] -0.59%*** -0.42%** 0.17%** 1.97  -0.29%** -0.17%** 0.12%* 
1.81 
[0, +5] -1.12%** -0.94%* 0.18%* 1.65  -0.98%* -0.39%** 0.59%* 
1.73 
[+5, +30] -1.64%* 0.35%* 1.99%* 1.73  -1.34%* 0.22%* 1.56%* 
1.84 






























Table 4-6 Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Acquirers on Explanatory 
Variables 
This table reports the results from regressing the cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers on different explanatory variables. 
The sample consists of 238 completed Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of 
acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender 
offers subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publ icly 
traded and Canadian and has stock return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research 
Center (CFMRC) and Compustat respectively. Pre CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to 
April 6, 2003; and for post CSOX sample the dates are from April 7, 2003 onwards. The dependent variable we use here is 
Cumulative Abnormal Return from t=-1 to t=+1, CAR-1,+1. First model uses a ‘CSOX’ dummy (equals to one if the 
announcement date was after April 6, 2003, and zero otherwise); Second model uses CSOX dummy along with target 
characteristics controls like firm size (log of total assets), leverage (long term debt scaled by total assets), and free cash flow 
(EBITDA scaled by total assets); Third model uses ‘CSOX’ dummy along with deal characteristics control variables like relative 
deal size (transaction value scaled by acquirer’s market value), premium (as reported on SDC platinum), ‘Hostile’ dummy 
(equals to one if the deal was flagged as hostile in SDC Platinum), and payment method dummy ‘Cash’ (equals to one if the deal 
was an all cash transaction). Returns are market adjusted. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels 
respectively. 
 
VARIABLES MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV 
CSOX (dummy) 0.002* 0.001 0.003 0.001 
















Deal Characteristics         





























Table 4-7 Relationship between Target Gain and Total and Acquirer Gains 
This table reports regression results where target gain is the dependent variable. In Model I Total Gain is the independent variable and in Model II Acquirer Gain is the independent 
variable. The sample consists of 238 completed Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial Data 
Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the 
target and acquirer are both publicly traded and Canadian and has stock return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) and 
Compustat respectively. Pre CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to April 6, 2003; and for post CSOX sample the dates are from April 7, 2003 
onwards. We classify acquisitions either as synergy driven or agency driven using the approach in Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993). They use the correlation between target gain 
and total gain and the correlation between target gain and acquirer gain are used as predictors of agency driven or synergy driven acquisition. A positive correlation factor implies 
the presence of synergy and vice versa. According to them, if the total, target, and acquirer gains are all positive then it is classified as a value-maximizing (synergy) merger; else it 
is an agency-driven merger. We calculate the cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date for both target and acquirer firms. Market model estimates for each firm 
were calculated using a maximum of 255 trading days of daily returns data beginning 127 days before the announcement of the first tender bid. Target gain is calculated by 
multiplying the CAR by the market value of target’s equity as of the end of six trading days prior to first announcement for  the target minus the value of target shares held by the 
acquirer before the announcement. Likewise, the acquirer gain is calculated by multiplying the CAR by the market value of acquiring firm as of the end of six trading days prior to 
the first announcement made by the acquiring firm. The total gain is the sum of the target and acquirer gains. Coefficients are estimated for the entire sample for each regime (pre- 





FULL SAMPLE POSITIVE TOTAL GAIN SUBSAMPLE NEGATIVE TOTAL GAIN SUBSAMPLE 
MODEL I MODEL II MODEL I MODEL II MODEL I MODEL II 
Pre CSOX 
(1996 - 2003) 
Post CSOX 
(2003 - 2009) 
Pre CSOX 
(1996 - 2003) 
Post CSOX 






























































(-3.76)   
ACQUIRER 













R-SQUARE 0.119 0.072 0.053 0.009 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.071 0.083 0.009 0.006 





Table 4-8 Operating Performance Analysis 
This table reports the industry adjusted post-acquisition operating performance results for the acquirers. The sample consists of 
238 completed Canadian tender offers between 1996 and 2009. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson 
Financial Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. Our final sample includes all completed tender offers subject to: (1) the 
deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $30 million; (2) the target and acquirer are both publicly traded and Canadian and has 
stock return and financial data available from Canadian Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) and Compustat 
respectively. Pre CSOX announcements cover announcement dates from January 1, 1996 to April 6, 2003; and for post CSOX 
sample the dates are from April 7, 2003 onwards. Panel A reports the detailed yearly post-acquisition operating performance. 
Operating performance is measured as the return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS). Barber and Lyon (1996) also use 
ROA and ROS as operating performance measures. ROA is the ratio of operating income scaled by total assets where operating 
income is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).  Likewise, ROS is measured as 
the ratio of operating income (EBITDA) scaled by sales revenue.  We analyze the ratios for 6-year period starting from the year 
of the announcement to five years after the acquisition. Panel B reports the cross sectional analysis where long term operating 
performance measures are the dependent variables. Adapting and expanding from Heron and Lie (2002) we use independent 
variables like CSOX dummy (equals to one if the announcement date was after April 6, 2003, and zero otherwise), ratio of targets 
assets to target and acquirer combined assets (assets are book value of assets and at time t=-1), market-to-book for acquirer (at t=-
1), market-to-book for target (at t=-1), same industry dummy (equals to one if 4-digit SIC matches, MSV 1990), and a delay 
variable (the time lag between the first announcement of a bid and the final acquisition of the target).***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively. Only ROA related results are presented for brevity. ROS related 
results are qualitatively similar and will be provided upon request from the author. 
Panel A reports the detailed performance results and Panel B provides the cross sectional analysis 
Panel A: Detailed Operating Performance Analysis 
YEAR 
Pre CSOX 
(1996 - 2003) 
  
Post CSOX 
(2003 - 2009) 
  Post - Pre 





















+5 -2.72%***   -0.86%*   1.86%* 
AVERAGE 3-YEAR -2.39%***   -0.70%**   1.69%** 













Panel B: Cross-Sectional Analysis 
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Sample Size 114 57 
Adjusted R-square 0.011 0.009 
 
 
 
 
